#php

The BMS/BAS controller has a directory traversal vulnerability that can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker to list the contents of arbitrary directories without reading file contents, leading to information disclosure of directory structures and filenames. This may expose sensitive system details, aiding in further attacks. The issue lies in the listFiles() function of the persistenceManagerAjax.php script, which calls PHP's readdir() function without proper input validation of the 'directory' POST parameter.

ABB Cylon Aspect version 3.08.01 has a directory traversal vulnerability that can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker to list the contents of arbitrary directories without reading file contents, leading to information disclosure of directory structures and filenames. This may expose sensitive system details, aiding in further attacks. The issue lies in the listFiles() function of the persistenceManagerAjax.php script, which calls PHP's readdir() function without proper input validation of the directory POST parameter.

In livewire/livewire `< v3.5.2`, the file extension of an uploaded file is guessed based on the MIME type. As a result, the actual file extension from the file name is not validated. An attacker can therefore bypass the validation by uploading a file with a valid MIME type (e.g., `image/png`) and a “.php” file extension. If the following criteria are met, the attacker can carry out an RCE attack: - Filename is composed of the original file name using `$file->getClientOriginalName()` - Files stored directly on your server in a public storage disk - Webserver is configured to execute “.php” files ### PoC In the following scenario, an attacker could upload a file called `shell.php` with an `image/png` MIME type and execute it on the remote server. ```php class SomeComponent extends Component { use WithFileUploads; #[Validate('image|extensions:png')] public $file; public function save() { $this->validate(); $this->file->storeAs( path: 'i...

ABB Cylon Aspect version 3.08.01 suffers from an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability. Input passed to the file parameter in calendarFileDelete.php is not properly sanitized before being used to delete calendar files. This can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker to delete files with the permissions of the web server using directory traversal sequences passed within the affected POST parameter.

The Top module for PHP-Nuke versions 6.x and below 7.6 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

The BMS/BAS controller suffers from an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability. Input passed to the 'file' parameter in calendarFileDelete.php is not properly sanitised before being used to delete calendar files. This can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker to delete files with the permissions of the web server using directory traversal sequences passed within the affected POST parameter.

Malicious Google sponsored results disguised as software downloads lead to malware.

### Summary The security scanner responsible for preventing XXE attacks in the XLSX reader can be bypassed by slightly modifying the XML structure, utilizing white-spaces. On servers that allow users to upload their own Excel (XLSX) sheets, Server files and sensitive information can be disclosed by providing a crafted sheet. ### Details The security scan function in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php` contains a flawed XML encoding check to retrieve the input file's XML encoding in the `toUtf8` function. The function searches for the XML encoding through a defined regex which looks for `encoding="*"` and/or `encoding='*'`, if not found, it defaults to the UTF-8 encoding which bypasses the conversion logic. ``` $patterns = [ '/encoding="([^"]*]?)"/', "/encoding='([^']*?)'/", ]; ``` This logic can be used to pass a UTF-7 encoded XXE payload, by utilizing a whitespace before or after the `=` in the attribute definition. ### PoC Needed: - ...

### Summary `\PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html` does not sanitize "javascript:" URLs from hyperlink `href` attributes, resulting in a Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability. ### PoC Example target script: ``` <?php require 'vendor/autoload.php'; $reader = \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory::createReader("Xlsx"); $spreadsheet = $reader->load(__DIR__ . '/book.xlsx'); $writer = new \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html($spreadsheet); print($writer->generateHTMLAll()); ``` Save this file in the same directory: [book.xlsx](https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/files/15099763/book.xlsx) Open index.php in a web browser and click on both links. The first demonstrates the vulnerability in a regular hyperlink and the second in a HYPERLINK() formula.

### Summary It's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file that links images from arbitrary paths. When embedding images has been enabled in HTML writer with `$writer->setEmbedImages(true);` those files will be included in the output as `data:` URLs, regardless of the file's type. Also URLs can be used for embedding, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability. ### Details XLSX files allow embedding or linking media. When In `xl/drawings/drawing1.xml` an attacker can do e.g.: ```xml <a:blip cstate="print" r:link="rId1" /> ``` And then, in `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` they can set the path to anything, such as: ```xml <Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image" Target="/etc/passwd" /> ``` or ```xml <Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image" Target="http://example.org" /> ``` When the HTML writer is outputting the...