#js

### Impact An attacker can write a malicious expression that escapes the sandbox to execute arbitrary code on the system. Example of vulnerable code: ```js const expressions = require("angular-expressions"); const result = expressions.compile("__proto__.constructor")({}, {}); // result should be undefined, however for versions <=1.4.2, it returns an object. ``` With a more complex (undisclosed) payload, one can get full access to Arbitrary code execution on the system. ### Patches The problem has been patched in version 1.4.3 of angular-expressions. ### Workarounds There is one workaround if it not possible for you to update : * Make sure that you use the compiled function with just one argument : ie this is not vulnerable : `const result = expressions.compile("__proto__.constructor")({});` : in this case you lose the feature of locals if you need it. ### Credits Credits go to [JorianWoltjer](https://github.com/JorianWoltjer) who has found the issue and reported it to ...

The ABB BMS/BAS controller suffers from an authenticated reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability. Input passed to the GET parameter 'port' is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML/JS code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site.

### Summary If a `server.ca` file is present in `LXD_DIR` at LXD start up, LXD is in "PKI mode". In this mode, only TLS clients that have a CA-signed certificate should be able to authenticate with LXD. We have discovered that if a client that sends a non-CA signed certificate during the TLS handshake, that client is able to authenticate with LXD if their certificate is present in the trust store. - The LXD Go client (and by extension `lxc`) does not send non-CA signed certificates during the handshake. - A manual client (e.g. `cURL`) might send a non-CA signed certificate during the handshake. #### Versions affected LXD 4.0 and above. ### Details When PKI mode was added to LXD it was intended that all client and server certificates *must* be signed by the certificate authority (see https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/2070/commits/84d917bdcca6fe1e3191ce47f1597c7d094e1909). In PKI mode, the TLS listener configuration is altered to add the CA certificate but the `ClientAut...

### Impact Several polynomial time complexity issues in league/commonmark may lead to unbounded resource exhaustion and subsequent denial of service. Malicious users could trigger that inefficient code with carefully crafted Markdown inputs that are specifically designed to ensure the worst-case performance is reached. Sending multiple such requests in parallel could tie up all available CPU resources and/or PHP-FPM processes, leading to denial of service for legitimate users. ### Patches These vulnerabilities have been patched in version 2.6.0. All users on older versions are highly encouraged to upgrade as soon as possible. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade, you may be able to mitigate the issues by: - Setting very low `memory_limit` and `max_execution_time` PHP configurations to prevent runaway resource usage - Implementing rate-limiting, bot protection, or other approaches to reduce the risk of simultaneous bad requests hitting your site - Limiting the size of inputs f...

### Summary When setting `WEBSOCKETS_GRAPHQL_AUTH` or `WEBSOCKETS_REST_AUTH` to "public", an unauthenticated user is able to do any of the supported operations (CRUD, subscriptions) with full admin privileges. ### Details Accountability for unauthenticated WebSocket requests is set to null, which used to be "public permissions" until the Permissions Policy update which now defaults that to system/admin level access. So instead of null we need to make use of `createDefaultAccountability()` to ensure public permissions are used for unauthenticated users. ### PoC 1. Start directus with ```bash WEBSOCKETS_ENABLED=true WEBSOCKETS_GRAPHQL_AUTH=public WEBSOCKETS_REST_AUTH=public ``` 2. Subscribe using GQL or REST or do any CRUD operation on a user created collection (system tables are not reachable with crud) ```gql subscription { directus_users_mutated { key event data { id email first_name last_name p...

Another day, another supply chain attack!

The ABB BMS/BAS controller suffers from an unauthenticated reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability. Input passed to the GET parameter 'redirect' is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML/JS code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site.

An issue was discovered in Django 5.1 before 5.1.4, 5.0 before 5.0.10, and 4.2 before 4.2.17. Direct usage of the django.db.models.fields.json.HasKey lookup, when an Oracle database is used, is subject to SQL injection if untrusted data is used as an lhs value. (Applications that use the jsonfield.has_key lookup via __ are unaffected.)

### Impact The regular expression that is vulnerable to backtracking can be generated in the 0.1.x release of `path-to-regexp`, originally reported here: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9wv6-86v2-598j ### Patches Upgrade to 0.1.12. ### Workarounds Avoid using two parameters within a single path segment, when the separator is not `.` (e.g. no `/:a-:b`). Alternatively, you can define the regex used for both parameters and ensure they do not overlap to allow backtracking. ### References - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9wv6-86v2-598j - https://blakeembrey.com/posts/2024-09-web-redos/

### Summary The Comment feature has implemented a filter to prevent users from adding restricted characters, such as HTML tags. However, this filter operates on the client-side, which can be bypassed, making the application vulnerable to HTML Injection. ### Details The Comment feature implements a character filter on the client-side, this can be bypassed by directly sending a request to the endpoint. Example Request: ``` PATCH /activity/comment/3 HTTP/2 Host: directus.local { "comment": "<h1>TEST <p style=\"color:red\">HTML INJECTION</p> <a href=\"//evil.com\">Test Link</a></h1>" } ``` Example Response: ```json { "data": { "id": 3, "action": "comment", "user": "288fdccc-399a-40a1-ac63-811bf62e6a18", "timestamp": "2023-09-06T02:23:40.740Z", "ip": "10.42.0.1", "user_agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36", "collection": "directus_files", "item": "7247dda1-c386-4e7a-...