#mac

REvil looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vulnerable DLL to execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware's own vulnerability will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Conti looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vulnerable DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware's own vulnerability will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

LokiLocker looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vulnerable DLL to execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

BlackBasta looks for and loads a DLL named wow64log.dll in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). Our BlackBasta exploit DLL must export the InterlockedExchange function or it fails with error. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Ransom.AvosLocker ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vulnerable DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-1660-01 - Red Hat OpenShift support for Windows Containers allows you to deploy Windows container workloads running on Windows Server containers.

WordPress Stafflist plugin version 3.1.2 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

Tiger Global Management invests $35 million in SkyHawk Security to accelerate growth.

Funding follows dramatic revenue growth as identity-based access requirements skyrocket.

An issue was discovered in Logitech Options. The OAuth 2.0 state parameter was not properly validated. This leaves applications vulnerable to CSRF attacks during authentication and authorization operations.