#js

A denial of service (DoS) vulnerability has been identified in the JavaScript library microlight version 0.0.7. This library, used for syntax highlighting, does not limit the size of textual content it processes in HTML elements with the microlight class. When excessively large content (e.g., 100 million characters) is processed, the reset function in microlight.js consumes excessive memory and CPU resources, causing browser crashes or unresponsiveness. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by tricking a user into visiting a malicious web page containing a microlight element with large content, resulting in a denial of service.

A null pointer dereference vulnerability was discovered in microlight.js (version 0.0.7), a lightweight syntax highlighting library. When processing elements with non-standard CSS color values, the library fails to validate the result of a regular expression match before accessing its properties, leading to an uncaught TypeError and potential application crash.

Mezzanine CMS, in versions prior to 6.1.1, contains a Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the admin interface. The vulnerability exists in the "displayable_links_js" function, which fails to properly sanitize blog post titles before including them in JSON responses served via "/admin/displayable_links.js". An authenticated admin user can create a blog post with a malicious JavaScript payload in the title field, then trick another admin user into clicking a direct link to the "/admin/displayable_links.js" endpoint, causing the malicious script to execute in their browser.

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package. The vulnerability stems from an unimplemented feature in the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next, which allowed unauthenticated users to proxy arbitrary remote content via the `/_next/image` endpoint. This issue allowed attackers to load remote resources from arbitrary hosts under the victim site’s domain for any site deployed using the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next. For example: `https://victim-site.com/_next/image?url=https://attacker.com`. In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site’s domain (`victim-site.com`), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services. ### Impact - SSRF via unrestricted remote URL loading - Arbitrary remote content loading - Potential internal service exposure or phishing risks through domain abuse ### Mitigation The following mitigations have been put in...

European law enforcement agencies have dismantled Archetyp Market, a long-running dark web platform used primarily for drug sales,…

Cybersecurity researchers are calling attention to a "large-scale campaign" that has been observed compromising legitimate websites with malicious JavaScript injections. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, these malicious injects are obfuscated using JSFuck, which refers to an "esoteric and educational programming style" that uses only a limited set of characters to write and execute code.

### Summary Various date messages returned by `Language::userDate` are inserted into raw HTML, allowing anybody who can edit those messages to insert arbitrary HTML into the DOM. ### Details The result of `$this->lang->userDate( $timestamp, $this->user )` returns unescaped values, but is inserted as raw HTML by Citizen: https://github.com/StarCitizenTools/mediawiki-skins-Citizen/blob/072e4365e9084e4b153eac62d3666566c06f5a49/includes/Components/CitizenComponentUserInfo.php#L55-L60 ### PoC 1. Go to any page using citizen with the uselang parameter set to x-xss and while being logged in Depending on the registration date of the account you're logged in with, various messages can be shown. In my case, it's `november`:  ### Impact This impacts wikis where a group has the `editinterface` but not the `editsitejs` user right.

### Summary All system messages in menu headings using the Menu.mustache template are inserted as raw HTML, allowing anybody who can edit those messages to insert arbitrary HTML into the DOM. ### Details The system messages for menu headings are inserted unescaped into raw HTML: https://github.com/StarCitizenTools/mediawiki-skins-Citizen/blob/072e4365e9084e4b153eac62d3666566c06f5a49/templates/Menu.mustache#L8-L10 ### PoC 1. Go to any article using citizen with the `uselang` parameter set to `x-xss` 2. A large number of alerts will be shown for various messages, e.g.:   On the main page of my test wiki, the following messages were shown: `navigation`, `notifications`, `user-interface-preferences`, `personaltools`, `variants`, `views`, `associated-pages`, `cactions` and `toolbox`. ### Impact This impacts wiki...

### Summary Various preferences messages are inserted into raw HTML, allowing anybody who can edit those messages to insert arbitrary HTML into the DOM. ### Details The `innerHtml` of the label div is set to the `textContent` of the label, essentially unsanitizing the system messages: https://github.com/StarCitizenTools/mediawiki-skins-Citizen/blob/407052e7069bdeae927d6f1a2a1c9a45b473bf9a/resources/skins.citizen.preferences/addPortlet.polyfill.js#L18 ### PoC 1. Edit `citizen-feature-custom-font-size-name` (or any other message displayed in a heading in the preferences menu) to `<img src="" onerror="alert('citizen-feature-custom-font-size-name')">` (script tags don't work here due to the way the HTML is inserted) 2. Open the preferences menu 

### Summary The `citizen-search-noresults-title` and `citizen-search-noresults-desc` system messages are inserted into raw HTML, allowing anybody who can edit those messages to insert arbitrary HTML into the DOM. ### Details The system messages are inserted as raw HTML by the mustache template: https://github.com/StarCitizenTools/mediawiki-skins-Citizen/blob/407052e7069bdeae927d6f1a2a1c9a45b473bf9a/resources/skins.citizen.search/templates/TypeaheadPlaceholder.mustache#L8-L9 ### PoC 1. Edit `citizen-search-noresults-title` and `citizen-search-noresults-desc` to `<img src="" onerror="alert('citizen-search-noresults-title')">` and `<img src="" onerror="alert('citizen-search-noresults-desc')">` (script tags don't work here due to the way the HTML is inserted) 2. Open the search bar and search for a page that doesn't exist to get the "no results" messages to show up  ![image](https://github.com/user...