#js

### Summary When you send a request with the `Authorization` header to one domain, and the response asks to redirect to a different domain, Deno's`fetch()` redirect handling creates a follow-up redirect request that keeps the original `Authorization` header, leaking its content to that second domain. ### Details The [right behavior](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#ref-for-cors-non-wildcard-request-header-name) would be to drop the `Authorization` header instead, in this scenario. The same is generally applied to `Cookie` and `Proxy-Authorization` headers, and is done for not only host changes, but also protocol/port changes. Generally referred to as "origin". The [documentation](https://docs.deno.com/runtime/reference/web_platform_apis/#:~:text=Deno%20does%20not%20follow%20the,leaking%20authenticated%20data%20cross%20origin.) states: > Deno does not follow the same-origin policy, because the Deno user agent currently does not have the concept of origins, and it does not have a cook...

### Impact A Denial of Service (DoS) attack allows attackers to construct requests that leaves requests to Server Actions hanging until the hosting provider cancels the function execution. _Note: Next.js server is idle during that time and only keeps the connection open. CPU and memory footprint are low during that time._ Deployments without any protection against long running Server Action invocations are especially vulnerable. Hosting providers like Vercel or Netlify set a default maximum duration on function execution to reduce the risk of excessive billing. This is the same issue as if the incoming HTTP request has an invalid `Content-Length` header or never closes. If the host has no other mitigations to those then this vulnerability is novel. This vulnerability affects only Next.js deployments using Server Actions. ### Patches This vulnerability was resolved in Next.js 14.2.21, 15.1.2, and 13.5.8. We recommend that users upgrade to a safe version. ### Workarounds There ar...

### Summary A **arbitrary file deletion vulnerability** has been identified in the latest version of Siyuan Note. The vulnerability exists in the `POST /api/history/getDocHistoryContent` endpoint.An attacker can craft a payload to exploit this vulnerability, resulting in the deletion of arbitrary files on the server. ### Details The vulnerability can be reproduced by sending a crafted request to the `/api/history/getDocHistoryContent` endpoint. Sending a request to the `/api/history/getDocHistoryContent` like: ``` curl "http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/history/getDocHistoryContent" -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"historyPath":"<abs_filepath_of_a_file>"}' ``` Replace `<abs_filepath_of_a_file>` with the absolute file path of the target file you wish to delete. The `historyPath` parameter in the payload is processed by the `func getDocHistoryContent` in `api/history.go:133`. In turn, `historyPath` is passed to the `func GetDocHistoryContent` located in `model/history....

The ABB Cylon Aspect BMS/BAS controller suffers from an unauthenticated reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability in the 'title' GET parameter. Input is not properly sanitized before being returned to the user, allowing the execution of arbitrary HTML/JS code in a user's browser session in the context of the affected site. While the factory test scripts included in the upgrade bundle are typically deleted, a short window for exploitation exists when the device is in the manufacturing phase.

### Summary This is a POC for a path-sanitizer [npm package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/path-sanitizer). The filters can be bypassed and can result in path traversal. Payload: `..=%5c` can be used to bypass this on CLI (along with other candidates). Something similar would likely work on web apps as well. ### PoC Here's the code to test for the filter bypass: ```js const sanitize = require("path-sanitizer") const path = require("path") const fs = require("fs") // Real scenario: function routeHandler(myPath) { // Lets just assume that the path was extracted from the request // We want to read a file in the C:\Users\user\Desktop\myApp\ directory // But the user should be able to access C:\Users\user\Desktop\ // So we need to sanitize the path const APP_DIR = "/var/hacker" const sanitized = path.join(APP_DIR, sanitize(myPath)) // Now we would usally read the file // But in this case we just gonna print the path // console.log(sanitized) return sanitized } fu...

Organizations in the region should expect to see threat actors accelerate their use of AI tools and mount ongoing "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks for various malicious use cases.

Apache NiFi 1.10.0 through 2.0.0 are missing fine-grained authorization checking for Parameter Contexts, referenced Controller Services, and referenced Parameter Providers, when creating new Process Groups. Creating a new Process Group can include binding to a Parameter Context, but in cases where the Process Group did not reference any Parameter values, the framework did not check user authorization for the bound Parameter Context. Missing authorization for a bound Parameter Context enabled clients to download non-sensitive Parameter values after creating the Process Group. Creating a new Process Group can also include referencing existing Controller Services or Parameter Providers. The framework did not check user authorization for referenced Controller Services or Parameter Providers, enabling clients to create Process Groups and use these components that were otherwise unauthorized. This vulnerability is limited in scope to authenticated users authorized to create Process Groups...

### Summary A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in lgsl. The issue arises from improper sanitation of user input. Everyone who accesses this page will be affected by this attack. ### Details The function `lgsl_query_40` in `lgsl_protocol.php` has implemented an HTTP crawler. This function makes a request to the registered game server, and upon crawling the malicious `/info` endpoint with our payload, will render our javascript on the info page. This information is being displayed via `lgsl_details.php` #### Affected Code: ```php foreach ($server['e'] as $field => $value) { $value = preg_replace('/((https*:\/\/|https*:\/\/www\.|www\.)[\w\d\.\-\/=$?​]*)/i', "<a href='$1' target='_blank'>$1</a>", html_entity_decode($value)); $output .= " <tr><td> {$field} </td><td> {$value} </td></tr>"; } ``` ### PoC 1. Create a game server with type `eco` and set the target host and port accordingly to your ttack server. I have crafted...

Marp Core ([`@marp-team/marp-core`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@marp-team/marp-core)) from v3.0.2 to v3.9.0 and v4.0.0, are vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) due to improper neutralization of HTML sanitization. ### Impact Marp Core includes an HTML sanitizer with allowlist support. In the affected versions, the built-in allowlist is enabled by default. When the allowlist is active, if insufficient HTML comments are included, the sanitizer may fail to properly sanitize HTML content and lead cross-site scripting (XSS). ### Patches Marp Core [v3.9.1](https://github.com/marp-team/marp-core/releases/tag/v3.9.1) and [v4.0.1](https://github.com/marp-team/marp-core/releases/tag/v4.0.1) have been patched to fix that. ### Workarounds If you are unable to update the package immediately, disable all HTML tags by setting `html: false` option in the `Marp` class constructor. ```javascript const marp = new Marp({ html: false }) ``` ### References - [CWE-79: Improper Neutralization...