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Emergency Ambulance Hiring Portal 1.0 WYSIWYG Code Injection

Emergency Ambulance Hiring Portal version 1.0 suffer from a WYSIWYG code injection vulnerability.

Packet Storm
#sql#vulnerability#windows#google#js#java#php#auth#firefox
GHSA-pvmm-55r5-g3mm: XWiki Platform document history including authors of any page exposed to unauthorized actors

### Impact The REST API exposes the history of any page in XWiki of which the attacker knows the name. The exposed information includes for each modification of the page the time of the modification, the version number, the author of the modification (both username and displayed name) and the version comment. This information is exposed regardless of the rights setup, and even when the wiki is configured to be fully private. On a private wiki, this can be tested by accessing `/xwiki/rest/wikis/xwiki/spaces/Main/pages/WebHome/history`, if this shows the history of the main page then the installation is vulnerable. ### Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and XWiki 16.3.0RC1. ### Workarounds There aren't any known workarounds apart from upgrading to a fixed version. ### References * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22052 * https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/9cbca9808300797c67779bb9a665d85cf9e3d4b8

GHSA-78vg-7v27-hj67: auditor-bundle vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting because name of entity does not get escaped

### Summary Unescaped entity property enables Javascript injection. ### Details I think this is possible because %source_label% in twig macro is not escaped. Therefore script tags can be inserted and are executed. ### PoC - clone example project https://github.com/DamienHarper/auditor-bundle-demo - create author with FullName <script>alert()</script> - delete author - view audit of authors - alert is displayed ### Impact persistent XSS. JS can be injected and executed.

DragonRank, a Chinese-speaking SEO manipulator service provider

Cisco Talos is disclosing a new threat called “DragonRank” that primarily targets countries in Asia and a few in Europe, operating PlugX and BadIIS for search engine optimization (SEO) rank manipulation.

GHSA-g4gc-rh26-m3p5: Keycloak Open Redirect vulnerability

An open redirect vulnerability was found in Keycloak. A specially crafted URL can be constructed where the `referrer` and `referrer_uri` parameters are made to trick a user to visit a malicious webpage. A trusted URL can trick users and automation into believing that the URL is safe, when, in fact, it redirects to a malicious server. This issue can result in a victim inadvertently trusting the destination of the redirect, potentially leading to a successful phishing attack or other types of attacks. Once a crafted URL is made, it can be sent to a Keycloak admin via email for example. This will trigger this vulnerability when the user visits the page and clicks the link. A malicious actor can use this to target users they know are Keycloak admins for further attacks. It may also be possible to bypass other domain-related security checks, such as supplying this as a OAuth redirect uri. The malicious actor can further obfuscate the `redirect_uri` using URL encoding, to hide the text of t...

GHSA-9wv6-86v2-598j: path-to-regexp outputs backtracking regular expressions

### Impact In certain cases, `path-to-regexp` will output a regular expression that can be exploited to cause poor performance. ### Patches For users of 0.1, upgrade to `0.1.10`. All other users should upgrade to `8.0.0`. Version 0.1.10 adds backtracking protection when a custom regular expression is not provided, so it's still possible to manually create a ReDoS vulnerability if you are providing custom regular expressions. Version 8.0.0 removes all features that can cause a ReDoS and stops exposing the regular expression directly. ### Workarounds All versions can be patched by providing a custom regular expression for parameters after the first in a single segment. As long as the custom regular expression does not match the text before the parameter, you will be safe. For example, change `/:a-:b` to `/:a-:b([^-/]+)`. If paths cannot be rewritten and versions cannot be upgraded, another alternative is to limit the URL length. For example, halving the attack string improves pe...