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#java
### Summary There is a `ReDoS vulnerability risk` in the system, specifically when administrators create `notification` through the web service(`pushdeer` and `whapi`). If a string is provided that triggers catastrophic backtracking in the regular expression, it may lead to a ReDoS attack. ### Details The regular expression` \/*$\` is used to match zero or more slashes `/` at the end of a URL. When a malicious attack string appends a large number of slashes `/` and a non-slash character at the end of the URL, the regular expression enters a backtracking matching process. During this process, the regular expression engine starts checking each slash from the first one, continuing until it encounters the last non-slash character. Due to the greedy matching nature of the regular expression, this process repeats itself, with each backtrack checking the next slash until the last slash is checked. This backtracking process consumes significant CPU resources. ```js .replace(/\/*$/, "") ``` Fo...
### Summary A publisher on a `publify` application is able to perform a cross-site scripting attack on an administrator using the redirect functionality. ### Details A publisher on a `publify` application is able to perform a cross-site scripting attack on an administrator using the redirect functionality. The exploitation of this XSS vulnerability requires the administrator to click a malicious link. We can create a redirect to a `javascript:alert()` URL. Whilst the redirect itself doesn't work, on the administrative panel, an a tag is created with the payload as the URI. Upon clicking this link, the XSS is triggered. An attack could attempt to hide their payload by using HTML, or other encodings, as to not make it obvious to an administrator that this is a malicious link. ### PoC A publisher can create a new redirect as shown below. The payload used is `javascript:alert()`. ) application that allows attackers to overwrite global variables and class attributes in certain Mesop modules during runtime. This vulnerability could directly lead to a denial of service (DoS) attack against the server. Additionally, it could also result in other severe consequences given the application's implementation, such as identity confusion, where an attacker could impersonate an assistant or system role within conversations. This impersonation could potentially enable jailbreak attacks when interacting with large language models (LLMs). Just like the Javascript's prototype pollution, this vulnerability could leave a way for attackers to manipulate the intended data-flow or control-flow of the application at runtime and lead to severe consequnces like RCE when gadgets are available.
## Impact Users running Vega/Vega-lite JSON definitions could run unexpected JavaScript code when drawing graphs, unless the library is used with the `vega-interpreter`. ## Workarounds - Use `vega` with [expression interpreter](https://vega.github.io/vega/usage/interpreter/) - Upgrade to a [newer Vega version](https://github.com/vega/vega/releases/tag/v5.32.0) (`5.32.0`) ### POC Summary Calling `replace` with a `RegExp`-like pattern calls `RegExp.prototype[@@replace]`, which can then call an attacker-controlled `exec` function. ### POC Details Consider the function call `replace('foo', {__proto__: /h/.constructor.prototype, global: false})`. Since `pattern` has `RegExp.prototype[@@replace]`, `pattern.exec('foo')` winds up being called. The resulting malicious call looks like this: ``` replace(<string argument>, {__proto__: /h/.constructor.prototype, exec: <function>, global: false}) ``` Since functions cannot be returned from this, an attacker that wishes to escalate to XSS mu...
### Impact In `vega` 5.30.0 and lower, `vega-functions` 5.15.0 and lower , it was possible to call JavaScript functions from the Vega expression language that were not meant to be supported. ### Patches Patched in `vega` `5.31.0` / `vega-functions` `5.16.0` ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ - Run `vega` without `vega.expressionInterpreter`. This mode is not the default as it is slower. - Using the interpreter [described in CSP safe mode](https://vega.github.io/vega/usage/interpreter/) (Content Security Policy) prevents arbitrary Javascript from running, so users of this mode are not affected by this vulnerability. ### References - Reported to Vega-Lite by @kprevas Nov 8 2024 in https://github.com/vega/vega-lite/issues/9469 & https://github.com/vega/vega/issues/3984 Reproduction of the error in Vega by @mattijn ``` { "$schema": "https://vega.github.io/schema/vega/v5.json", "signals": [ { "name...
An ongoing campaign that infiltrates legitimate websites with malicious JavaScript injects to promote Chinese-language gambling platforms has ballooned to compromise approximately 150,000 sites to date. "The threat actor has slightly revamped their interface but is still relying on an iframe injection to display a full-screen overlay in the visitor's browser," c/side security analyst Himanshu
Researchers have uncovered a critical vulnerability (CVE-2025-29927) in Next.js middleware, allowing authorization bypass. Learn about the exploit and fixes.
### Impact This impact users of Shescape on Windows that explicitly configure `shell: 'cmd.exe'` or `shell: true` using any of `quote`/`quoteAll`/`escape`/`escapeAll`. An attacker may be able to get read-only access to environment variables. Example: ```javascript import * as cp from "node:child_process"; import { Shescape } from "shescape"; // 1. Prerequisites const shescape = new Shescape({ shell: "cmd.exe", // Or shell: true, // Only if the default shell is CMD }); // 2. Payload const payload = '"%PATH%'; // 3. Usage let escapedPayload; escapedPayload = shescape.quote(payload); // Or escapedPayload = shescape.quoteAll([payload]); // Or escapedPayload = shescape.escape(payload); // Or escapedPayload = shescape.escapeAll([payload]); // And (example) const result = cp.execSync(`echo Hello ${escapedPayload}`, options); // 4. Impact console.log(result.toString()); // Outputs "Hello" followed by the contents of the PATH environment variable ``` For Shescape prior to ...
### Impact A vulnerability was found in OIDC-Client. When using the elytron-oidc-client subsystem with WildFly, authorization code injection attacks can occur, allowing an attacker to inject a stolen authorization code into the attacker's own session with the client with a victim's identity. This is usually done with a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) or phishing attack. ### Patches [2.2.9.Final](https://github.com/wildfly-security/wildfly-elytron/releases/tag/2.2.9.Final) [2.6.2.Final](https://github.com/wildfly-security/wildfly-elytron/releases/tag/2.6.2.Final) ### Workarounds Currently, no mitigation is currently available for this vulnerability. ### References https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12369 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-12369 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2331178 https://issues.redhat.com/browse/ELY-2887