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## Summary When updating the root role, a TUF client must establish a trusted line of continuity to the latest set of keys. While sequentially downloading new versions of the root metadata file, tough will not check that the root object version it received was the next sequential version from the previously trusted root metadata. ## Impact The tough client will trust an outdated or rotated root role in the event that an actor with control of the storage medium of a trusted TUF repository inappropriately replaced the contents of one of the root metadata files with an adequately signed previous version. As a result, tough could trust content associated with a previous root role. Impacted versions: < v0.20.0 ## Patches A fix for this issue is available in tough version 0.20.0 and later. Customers are advised to upgrade to version 0.20.0 or later and ensure any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. ## Workarounds There is no recommended work around. Cus...
### Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-95j3-435g-vjcp. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ### Original Description Cross Site Scripting vulnerability in Leantime v3.2.1 and before allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code and obtain sensitive information via the first name field in processMentions().
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### Summary A publisher on a `publify` application is able to perform a cross-site scripting attack on an administrator using the redirect functionality. ### Details A publisher on a `publify` application is able to perform a cross-site scripting attack on an administrator using the redirect functionality. The exploitation of this XSS vulnerability requires the administrator to click a malicious link. We can create a redirect to a `javascript:alert()` URL. Whilst the redirect itself doesn't work, on the administrative panel, an a tag is created with the payload as the URI. Upon clicking this link, the XSS is triggered. An attack could attempt to hide their payload by using HTML, or other encodings, as to not make it obvious to an administrator that this is a malicious link. ### PoC A publisher can create a new redirect as shown below. The payload used is `javascript:alert()`. . The severity is also dependent on **arbitrary archives** being passed or not. Based on the above, severity high was picked to be safe. ### Patches Patched with the help of snyk and gosec in v1.0.1 ### Workarounds The only workaround is to manually validate archives before submitting them to this library, however that is not recommended vs upgrading to unaffected versions. ### References https://security.snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability
The phishing campaign is highly sophisticated!