#git

### Impact This is a high priority vulnerability and users must upgrade ASAP. The signature component of the authorization may be invalid, which would mean that as a client you can use any arbitrary secret to upload objects given the user already has prior WRITE permissions on the bucket, Prior knowledge of access-key, and bucket name this user might have access to - and an access-key with a WRITE permissions is necessary. However with relevant information in place, uploading random objects to buckets is trivial and easy via `curl` ### Patches Yes https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/21103 ### Workarounds Reject requests with `x-amz-content-sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER` for now at LB layer, ask application users to use `STREAMING-AWS4-HMAC-SHA256-PAYLOAD-TRAILER`

### Impact If the JIRA macro is installed, any logged in XWiki user could edit his/her user profile wiki page and use that JIRA macro, specifying a fake JIRA URL that returns an XML specifying a DOCTYPE pointing to a local file on the XWiki server host and displaying that file's content in one of the returned JIRA fields (such as the summary or description for example). For example: ``` <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]> <rss version="0.92"> ... <item> <title>&xxe;</title> <link>https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XE-307</link> <project id="10222" key="XE">{RETIRED} XWiki Enterprise</project> <description>&xxe;</description> <environment/> ... ``` ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in the JIRA Extension v8.6.5. ### Workarounds No easy workaround except to upgrade (which is easy using the XWiki Extension Manager). ### References * https://github.com/xwiki-contrib/jira/commit/98a...

### Summary The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser. ### Impact Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [server.host config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected.. ### Details #### `.svg` Requests ending with `.svg` are loaded at this line. https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290 By adding `?.svg` with `?.wasm?init` or with `sec-fetch-dest: script` header, the restriction was able to bypass. This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than [`build.assetsInlineLimit`](https://vite.dev/config/build-options.html#build-assetsinlinelimit) (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+. #### relative paths The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. `../../`). ### PoC ```bash npm create vite@latest cd vite-project/ npm insta...

### Original message: I found an issue with security grants on on properties in the GraphQL ItemNormalizer: If you use something like `#[ApiProperty(security: 'is_granted("PROPERTY_READ", [object, property])')]` on a member of an entity, the grant gets cached and is only evaluated once, even if the `object` in question is a different one. There is the `ApiPlatform\GraphQl\Serializer\ItemNormalizer::isCacheKeySafe()` method that seems to be intended to prevent this: https://github.com/api-platform/core/blob/88f5ac50d20d6510686a7552310cc567fcca45bf/src/GraphQl/Serializer/ItemNormalizer.php#L160-L164 and in its usage on line 90 it does indeed not create a cache key, but the `parent::normalize()` that is called afterwards still creates the cache key and causes the issue. ### Impact It grants access to properties that it should not. ### Workarounds Override the ItemNormalizer. Patched at: https://github.com/api-platform/core/commit/7af65aad13037d7649348ee3dcd88e084ef771f8

## Summary Due to a weak Content Security Policy on the `/proxy/*` route, an attacker can bypass the CSP of the media proxy and execute cross-site scripting when opening external images in a new tab/window. ## Impact A malicious feed added to Miniflux can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the user's browser when opening external resources, such as proxified images, in a new tab or window. ## Mitigation The CSP for the media proxy has been changed from `default-src 'self'` to `default-src 'none'; form-action 'none'; sandbox;`. Upgrade to Miniflux >= 2.2.7 ## Credit [RyotaK](https://ryotak.net) (GMO Flatt Security Inc.) with [takumi-san.ai](https://takumi-san.ai)

### Summary Using the Relay special `node` type you can bypass the configured security on an operation. ### Details Here is an example of how to apply security configurations for the GraphQL operations: ```php #[ApiResource( security: "is_granted('ROLE_USER')", operations: [ /* ... */ ], graphQlOperations: [ new Query(security: "is_granted('ROLE_USER')"), //... ], )] class Book { /* ... */ } ``` This indeed checks `is_granted('ROLE_USER')` as expected for a GraphQL query like the following: ```php ‌query { book(id: "/books/1") { title } } ``` But the security check can be bypassed by using the `node` field (that is available by default) on the root query type like that: ```php ‌query { node(id: "/books/1") { ... on Book { title } } } ``` This does not execute any security checks and can therefore be used to access any entity without restrictions by everyone that has access to the API. ### Impa...

### Summary CWE-470 (Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection') when having Javers selected as Entity Audit Framework ### Details In the following two occurences, user input directly leads to class loading without checking against e.g. a whitelist of allowed classes. This is also known as CWE-470 https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster-entity-audit/blob/e21e83135d10c77d92203c89cb0b0063914e8fe0/generators/spring-boot-javers/templates/src/main/java/_package_/web/rest/JaversEntityAuditResource.java.ejs#L88 https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster-entity-audit/blob/e21e83135d10c77d92203c89cb0b0063914e8fe0/generators/spring-boot-javers/templates/src/main/java/_package_/web/rest/JaversEntityAuditResource.java.ejs#L124 So, if an attacker manages to place some malicious classes into the classpath and also has access to these REST interface for calling the mentioned REST endpoints, using these lines of code can lead to unintended remote cod...

## Overview On many platforms, a third party can create a Git repository under a name that includes a shell command substitution [^1] string in the syntax `$(<command>)`. These directory names are allowed in macOS and a majority of Linux distributions [^2]. If a user starts `jupyter-lab` in a parent directory of this inappropriately-named Git repository, opens it, and clicks "Git > Open Git Repository in Terminal" from the menu bar, then the injected command `<command>` is run in the user's shell without the user's permission. This issue is occurring because when that menu entry is clicked, `jupyterlab-git` opens the terminal and runs `cd <git-repo-path>` through the shell to set the current directory [^3]. Doing so runs any command substitution strings present in the directory name, which leads to the command injection issue described here. A previous patch provided an incomplete fix [^4]. [^1]: https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/html_node/Command-Substitution.html [^2]: http...

The cascading supply chain attack that initially targeted Coinbase before becoming more widespread to single out users of the "tj-actions/changed-files" GitHub Action has been traced further back to the theft of a personal access token (PAT) related to SpotBugs. "The attackers obtained initial access by taking advantage of the GitHub Actions workflow of SpotBugs, a popular open-source tool for

The Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) has revealed that no less than three cyber attacks were recorded against state administration bodies and critical infrastructure facilities in the country with an aim to steal sensitive data. The campaign, the agency said, involved the use of compromised email accounts to send phishing messages containing links pointing to legitimate