Security
Headlines
HeadlinesLatestCVEs

Tag

#git

Ethereum’s Pivotal Role in Decentralized Finance Evolution

Once upon a time, say, 2016, Ethereum was a curious new arrival in the crypto space. It promised…

HackRead
#redis#git
GHSA-3w94-vq2x-v5wr: ethereum does not check transaction malleability for EIP-2930, EIP-1559 and EIP-7702 transactions

### Impact Prior to `ethereum` crate v0.18.0, signature malleability (according to EIP-2) was only checked for "legacy" transactions, but not for EIP-2930, EIP-1559 and EIP-7702 transactions. This is a specification deviation and therefore a high severity advisory if the `ethereum` crate is used for Ethereum mainnet. Note that signature malleability itself is not a security issue, and therefore if the `ethereum` crate is used on a single-implementation blockchain, it's a low/informational severity advisory. ### Patches The issue is fixed in `ethereum` v0.18.0 ### Workarounds You can also manually check transaction malleability outside of the crate. But it's recommended to simply upgrade the version. ### References See PR: https://github.com/rust-ethereum/ethereum/pull/67

Blind Eagle Linked to Russian Host Proton66 in Latin America Attacks

Blind Eagle hackers linked to Russian host Proton66 to target banks in Latin America using phishing and RATs. Trustwave urges stronger security.

Qantas: Breach affects 6 million people, “significant” amount of data likely taken

Australian airline Qantas has confirmed a data breach at a third party provider that affects six million customers.

Verizon and T-Mobile Deny Data Breaches as Millions of User Records Sold Online

User claims to sell stolen Verizon and T-Mobile data for millions of users (online Verizon says data is old T-Mobile denies any breach and links to it.

That Network Traffic Looks Legit, But it Could be Hiding a Serious Threat

With nearly 80% of cyber threats now mimicking legitimate user behavior, how are top SOCs determining what’s legitimate traffic and what is potentially dangerous? Where do you turn when firewalls and endpoint detection and response (EDR) fall short at detecting the most important threats to your organization? Breaches at edge devices and VPN gateways have risen from 3% to 22%, according to

PDFs: Portable documents, or perfect deliveries for phish?

A popular social engineering technique returns: callback phishing, or TOAD attacks, which leverage PDFs, VoIP anonymity and even QR code tricks.

Vercel's v0 AI Tool Weaponized by Cybercriminals to Rapidly Create Fake Login Pages at Scale

Unknown threat actors have been observed weaponizing v0, a generative artificial intelligence (AI) tool from Vercel, to design fake sign-in pages that impersonate their legitimate counterparts. "This observation signals a new evolution in the weaponization of Generative AI by threat actors who have demonstrated an ability to generate a functional phishing site from simple text prompts," Okta

GHSA-m43g-m425-p68x: junit-platform-reporting can leak Git credentials through its OpenTestReportGeneratingListener

### Summary This vulnerability affects JUnit's support for writing Open Test Reporting XML files which is an opt-in feature of `junit-platform-reporting`. If a repository is cloned using a GitHub token or other credentials in its URL, for example: ```bash git clone https://${GH_APP}:${GH_TOKEN}@github.com/example/example.git ``` The credentials are captured by `OpenTestReportGeneratingListener` which produces (trimmed for brevity): ```xml <infrastructure> <git:repository originUrl="https://username:[email protected]/example/example.git" /> </infrastructure> ``` ### Details https://github.com/junit-team/junit5/blob/6b7764dac92fd35cb348152d1b37f8726875a4e0/junit-platform-reporting/src/main/java/org/junit/platform/reporting/open/xml/OpenTestReportGeneratingListener.java#L183 I think this should be configurable in some way to exclude select git information or exclude it entirely. ### PoC 1. Clone a repo using a GitHub token as shown above. 2. Enable the listener `junit.platfor...

GHSA-h34r-jxqm-qgpr: juju/utils leaks private key in certs

### Summary Certs generated by v4 contain their private key. ## Details ### Background Recently, I encountered an API in Go that’s easy to misuse: sha512.Sum384 and sha512.New384().Sum look very similar and behave very differently. https://go.dev/play/p/kDCqqoYk84k demonstrates this. I want to discuss extending static analysis to detect this case with the go community, but before I do that, I want to make a best-effort pass at open-source projects to fix the existing bugs. I figured that if there were any vulnerabilities out there, they would be easy to find once that discussion begins, so it’s better to address them early. This work is a hobby project and has no affiliation with my employer, so I may be slow to respond due to existing commitments. ### PoC https://go.dev/play/p/vSW0U3Hq4qk ### Impact [This code](https://github.com/juju/utils/blob/0141ef0ee74a0cac603c5c9e4aff194008722f41/cert/cert.go#L120) (cert.NewLeaf) generates certs with the SubjectKeyId set to `sha512.Ne...