The White House issued an executive order on Wednesday that aims to prevent the sale of Americans' data to “countries of concern,” including China and Russia. Its effectiveness may vary.

US president Joe Biden will sign an executive order on Wednesday aimed at preventing a handful of countries, including China, North Korea, and Russia, from purchasing sensitive information about Americans through commercial data brokers in the United States.

Administration officials say categories of sensitive data, including personal identifiers, precise location information, and biometrics—vital tools for waging cyberattacks, espionage, and blackmail operations against the US—are being amassed by what the White House is calling “countries of concern.”

Biden administration officials disclosed the order to reporters in advance during a Zoom call on Tuesday and briefly took questions, on the condition that they not be named or referred to by job title.

The order will have few immediate effects, they said. The US Justice Department will instead launch a rulemaking process aimed at mapping out a “data security program” envisioned by the White House. The process affords experts, industry stakeholders, and the public at large an opportunity to chime in prior to the government adopting the proposal.

White House officials said the US Attorney General would consult with the heads of the Department of State and Department of Commerce to finalize a list of countries falling under the eye of the program. A tentative list given to reporters during Tuesday’s call, however, included China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela.

The categories of information covered by the program will include health and financial data, precise geolocation information, and “certain sensitive government-related data,” among others, the officials said. The order will contain several carve-outs for certain financial transactions and activities that are “incidental” to ordinary business operations.

It’s unclear to what degree such a program would be effective. Notably, it does not extend to a majority of countries where trafficking in Americans’ private data will ostensibly remain legal. What’s more, it’s unclear whether the government has the authority or wherewithal (outside of an act of Congress) to restrict countries that, while diplomatically and militarily allied with the US, are also known to conduct espionage against it: close US ally Israel, for instance, was accused in 2019 of planting cell-phone-spying devices near the White House, and has served as an international marketplace for illicit spyware; or Saudi Arabia, which availed itself of that market in 2018 to covertly surveil a _Washington Post_ contributor who was later abducted and murdered by a Saudi hit squad.

If China, Russia, or North Korea moves to obtain US data from a third party in one of the more than 170 countries not on the US government’s list, there may be little to prevent it. US data brokers need only take steps to ensure overseas customers follow “certain security requirements” during the transfer, many of which are already required by law.

The restrictions imposed by the executive order are meant to protect against “direct” and “indirect transfers of data,” officials said. But data brokers are on the hook merely until they obtain “some type of commitment" from overseas customers—an “understanding”—when it comes to the possibility of data being sold or transferred to others down the line.

Biden Executive Order Bans Sale of US Data to China, Russia. Good Luck

Canada-based Sandvine has long sold its web-monitoring tech to authoritarian regimes. This week, the US sanctioned the company, severely limiting its ability to do business with American firms.

When the Egyptian government shut down the internet in 2011 to give itself cover to crush a popular protest movement, it was Nora Younis who got the word out. Younis, then a journalist with daily newspaper _Al-Masry Al-Youm_, found a working internet connection at the InterContinental Cairo Semiramis Hotel that overlooked Tahrir Square, the heart of the protests. From the balcony, she filmed as protesters were shot and run down with armored vehicles, posting the footage to the newspaper’s website, where it was picked up by global media.

In 2016, with Egypt having slid back into the authoritarianism that prompted the uprising, Younis launched her own media platform, Al-Manassa, which combined citizen journalism with investigative reporting. The following year, Almanassa.com suddenly disappeared from the Egyptian internet, along with a handful of other independent publications. It was still available overseas, but domestic users couldn’t see it. Younis’ team moved their site to a new domain. That, too, was rapidly blocked, so they moved again and were blocked again. After three years and more than a dozen migrations to new domains and subdomains, they asked for help from the Swedish digital forensics nonprofit Qurium, which figured out how the blocks were being implemented—using a network management tool provided by a Canadian tech company called Sandvine.

Sandvine is well known in digital rights circles, but unlike leading villains of the spyware world such as NSO Group or Candiru, it’s often floated below the eyeline of lawmakers and regulators. The company, owned by the private equity group Francisco Partners, mainly sells above-board technology to internet service providers and telecom companies to help them run their networks. But it has often sold that technology to regimes that have abused it, using it to censor, shut down, and surveil activists, journalists, and political opponents.

On Monday, after years of lobbying from digital rights activists, the US Department of Commerce added Sandvine to its Entity List, effectively blacklisting it from doing business with American partners. The department said that the company’s technology was “used in mass-web monitoring and censorship” in Egypt, “contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.” Digital rights activists say it’s a major victory because it shows that companies can’t avoid responsibility when they sell potentially dangerous products to clients who are likely to abuse them.

“Better late than never,” Tord Lundström, Qurium’s technical director, says. “Sandvine is a shameless example of how technology is not neutral when seeking profit at all costs.”

”We are aware of the action announced by the US Commerce Department, and we’re working closely with government officials to understand, address, and resolve their concerns,” says Sandvine spokesperson Susana Schwartz. “Sandvine solutions help provide a reliable and safe internet, and we take allegations of misuse very seriously.”

Sandvine’s flagship product is deep packet inspection, or DPI, a common tool used by ISPs and telecom companies to monitor traffic and prioritize certain types of content. DPI lets network administrators see what’s in a packet of data flowing on the network in real time, so it can intercept or divert it. It can be used, for example, to give priority to traffic from streaming services over static web pages or downloads, so that users don’t see glitches in their streams. It has been used in some countries to filter out child sexual abuse images.

Dictators Used Sandvine Tech to Censor the Internet. The US Finally Did Something About It

Two months ago, the FBI “disrupted” the BlackCat ransomware group. They're already back—and their latest attack is causing delays at pharmacies across the US.

Six days before Christmas, the US Department of Justice loudly announced a win in the ongoing fight against the scourge of ransomware: An FBI-led, international operation had targeted the notorious hacking group known as BlackCat or AlphV, releasing decryption keys to foil its ransom attempts against hundreds of victims and seizing the dark web sites it had used to threaten and extort them. “In disrupting the BlackCat ransomware group, the Justice Department has once again hacked the hackers,” deputy attorney general Lisa Monaco declared in a statement.

Two months and one week later, however, those hackers don't appear particularly “disrupted.” For the last seven days and counting, BlackCat has held hostage the medical firm Change Healthcare, crippling its software in hospitals and pharmacies across the United States, leading to delays in drug prescriptions for an untold number of patients.

The ongoing outage at Change Healthcare, first reported to be a BlackCat attack by Reuters, represents a particularly grim incident in the ransomware epidemic not just due to its severity, its length, and the potential toll on victims' health. Ransomware-tracking analysts say it also illustrates how even law enforcement's wins against ransomware groups appear to be increasingly short-lived, as the hackers that law enforcement target in carefully coordinated busts simply rebuild and restart their attacks with impunity.

“Because we can't arrest the core operators that are in Russia or in areas that are uncooperative with law enforcement, we can't stop them,” says Allan Liska, a ransomware-focused researcher for cybersecurity firm Recorded Future. Instead, Liska says, law enforcement often has had to settle for spending months or years arranging takedowns that target infrastructure or aid victims, but without laying hands on the attacks' perpetrators. “The threat actors just need to regroup, get drunk for a weekend, and then start right back up,” Liska says.

In another, more recent bust, the UK's National Crime Agency last week led a broad takedown effort against the notorious Lockbit ransomware group, hijacking its infrastructure, seizing many of its cryptocurrency wallets, taking down its dark web sites, and even obtaining information about its operators and partners. Yet less than a week later, Lockbit has already launched a fresh dark web site where it continues to extort its victims, showing countdown timers for each one that indicate the remaining days or hours before it dumps their stolen data online.

None of that means law enforcement's BlackCat or Lockbit operations haven't had some effect. BlackCat listed 28 victims on its dark web site for February so far, a significant drop from the 60-plus Recorded Future counted on its site in December prior to the FBI's takedown. (Change Healthcare isn't currently listed among BlackCat's current victims on its site, though the hackers reportedly took credit for the attack, according to ransomware-tracking site Breaches.net. Change Healthcare also didn't respond to WIRED's request for comment on the cyberattack.)

Lockbit, for its part, may be hiding the extent of its disruption behind the bluster of its new leak site, argues Brett Callow, a ransomware analyst at security firm Emsisoft. He says that the group is likely downplaying last week's bust in part to avoid losing the trust of its affiliate partners, the hackers who penetrate victim networks on Lockbit's behalf and might be spooked by the possibility that Lockbit has been compromised by law enforcement.

Nonetheless, Callow says, ransomware actors “do seem to be bouncing back faster.” That's only to be expected, he argues, when the hackers aren't in custody and the money to be made provides the resources and the incentive to simply get back to work, even after seizures or disruptions. In 2023, he notes, cryptocurrency tracing firm Chainalysis pegged total ransoms paid by victims at a record-breaking $1.1 billion. “It's inevitable that groups are going to try harder to maintain their share of that massively profitable industry,” Callow says.

When the FBI targeted BlackCat in December, for instance, the group immediately posted on a newly launched dark web site a message to its partners, promising a higher rate of payment and removing all restrictions on potential victims, other than those in the former Soviet Union, a typical rule for Russia-based cybercriminals. The message suggested its affiliate hackers could now target “hospitals, nuclear power plants, anything and anywhere.” (In fact, the rule change was at least in part a scare tactic, says Recorded Future's Liska—BlackCat had targeted hospitals before.)

Ransomware groups' quick recoveries from recent law enforcement operations contrast with earlier cases when actual arrests were made—almost always arrests of ransomware group members or partners outside of Russia. Those cases, like the arrest of a suspect in Florida who was allegedly associated with the Scattered Spider group that targeted MGM Casinos last year, had far more permanent effects.

Even some past takedowns that _didn't_ include arrests, however, have put longer-lasting dents in the ransomware economy. The FBI's hijacking of infrastructure belonging to the Hive ransomware group early last year led to a nearly year-long disappearance of the group before it resurfaced under the name Hunters International, says Jackie Burns Koven, Chainalysis's head of cyber threat intelligence. Chainalysis estimates the Hive operation averted more than $210 million in total ransoms paid.

Ransomware groups may be rebuilding faster over time in part due to the increasing sophistication of the ransomware economy, Burns Koven says. Hackers who have been targeted in disruption operations can now quickly purchase access to malware or other tools, crime-friendly hosting providers, or even buy their way into breached organizations from other hackers who act as “access brokers.” But Burns Koven also notes that law enforcement operations help to degrade that economy by creating divisions between hackers. In the wake of the Lockbit takedown, for instance, the cybercriminal marketplace Breached Forum banned the sale of ransomware tools and services in an apparent attempt to avoid law enforcement's scrutiny. “What these operations do is degrade trust among members and cause operational friction,” she says.

All of that suggests that law enforcement disruption campaigns serve a purpose. But they won't solve the ransomware problem on their own, argues Emsisoft's Callow. The larger solution, he says, will have to include improved security for potential victim organizations, sanctions on ransomware actors and those associated with them, tighter regulations on cryptocurrency, and perhaps even laws banning ransomware payments—a controversial proposal.

“Disruption efforts alone aren’t likely to represent a solution to the ransomware problem. Rather, they need to be part of a multi-pronged strategy,” says Callow. “Tightening the screws on every single bit of the ransomware ecosystem.”

Change Healthcare Ransomware Attack: BlackCat Hackers Quickly Returned After FBI Bust

Ankle tags that constantly log a person’s coordinates are part of a growing cadre of experimental surveillance tools that countries around the world are trying out on new arrivals.

Mark Nelson took the call in an immigration detention center—a place that, to him, felt just like prison. It had the same prison windows, the same tiny box rooms. By the time the phone rang, he’d already spent 10 days detained there, and he was wracked with worry that he would be forced onto a plane without the chance to say goodbye to his kids. So when his lawyers relayed the two options available under UK law—either stay in detention indefinitely or go home wearing a tracking device—it didn’t exactly feel like a choice. “That’s being coerced,” says Nelson, who moved from Jamaica to the UK more than 20 years ago. He felt desperate to get out of there and go home to his family—even if a GPS tag had to come too.

It was May 2022 when the contractors arrived at Colnbrook Detention Center, on the edge of London’s Heathrow Airport, to fit the device. Nelson knew the men were with the government’s Electronic Monitoring Service, but he didn’t know their names or the company they worked for. Still, he followed them to a small room, where they measured his leg and locked the device around his ankle. Since then, for almost two years, Nelson has been accompanied by the tag wherever he goes. Whether he is watching TV, taking his kids to school, or in the shower, his tag is continuously logging his coordinates and sending them back to the company that operates the tag on behalf of the British government.

Nelson lifts up his trousers to reveal the tag, wrapped around his leg, like a giant gray leech. He chokes down tears as he describes the impact the device has had on his life. “It’s depressing,” he says, being under constant surveillance. “Right through this process, it’s like I’m not a human anymore.”

In England and Wales, since 2019, people convicted of knife crime or other violent offenses have been ordered to wear GPS ankle tags upon their release from prison. But requiring anyone facing a deportation order to wear a GPS tag is a more recent and more controversial policy, introduced in 2021. Nelson wears a tag because his right to remain in the UK was revoked following his conviction for growing cannabis in 2017—a crime for which he served two years of a four-year sentence. But migrants arriving in small boats on the coast of southern England, with no previous convictions, were also tagged during an 18-month pilot program that ended in December 2023. Between 2022 and 2023, the number of people ordered to wear GPS trackers jumped by 56 percent to more than 4,000 people, according to research by the Public Law Project, a legal nonprofit.

“Foreign nationals who abuse our hospitality by committing crimes in the UK should be in no doubt of our determination to deport them,” a Home Office spokesperson tells WIRED. “Where removal isn’t immediately possible, electronic monitoring can be used to manage foreign national offenders and selected others released on immigration bail.” The Home Office, the UK’s interior ministry, declined to answer questions on “operational details,” such as whether GPS coordinates are being tracked in real time and for how long the Home Office stores individuals’ location data. “This highly intrusive form of surveillance is being used to solve a problem that does not exist,” says Jo Hynes, a senior researcher at the Public Law Project. GPS tags are designed to prevent people facing deportation orders from going on the run. But according to Hynes, only 1.3 percent of people on immigration bail absconded in the first six months of 2022.

Now, Nelson is the first person to challenge Britain’s GPS tagging regime in a high court, arguing that the tags are a disproportionate breach of privacy. A judgment on the case is expected any day now, and critics of GPS tagging hope the decision will have ripple effects throughout the British immigration system. “A judgment in Mark’s favor could take quite a lot of different forms,” says Jonah Mendelsohn, a legal officer at data rights group Privacy International. He adds that the court could force the Home Office to stop tagging migrants altogether, or it could limit the amount of data the tags collect. “It could set a precedent.”

The GPS tags are part of an intensifying surveillance regime that migrants and refugees are now subject to in the UK, the US, and Australia, says Mendelsohn. “There is so much tech that’s being rolled out and used almost in an experimental lab-esque way,” he says, pointing to how migrants arriving in Britain on small boats have been told to hand over their phones and pin codes or fitted with bar-coded wristbands. “GPS tracking is just one aspect of that.”

Allegations that the tags are prone to malfunction also aggravate the stress people feel while wearing them, Mendelsohn says. By law, the tags can’t be removed. But they still need charging, either by being plugged into a socket or a portable battery pack. Nelson’s first tag would run out of battery every two hours, he claims, meaning he could never travel far from a plug socket—failure to charge a tag can count as a breach of immigration bail conditions, risking return to a detention center.

The battery was just one in a series of problems, Nelson claims. Between November 2022 and May 2023, he believes his tag was no longer logging his GPS coordinates, with his legal team at Wilsons Solicitors arguing this proved the tag was redundant and should be removed. But until now, the Home Office has refused to take off the tag. “\[They said\] the law is the law and I’m subject to the law,” says Nelson. “So I’ve got to wear this broken tag whether it works or not.” The company that monitors and maintains the tags on behalf of the government since 2014, Capita Business Services, did not reply to WIRED’s request to comment.

Nelson might have been the first person to challenge the GPS tagging regime in court. But others were close behind. British law firm Duncan Lewis Solicitors is representing another four people forced to wear GPS tags, ranging from EU citizens to people who arrived in the UK on small boats. “Such surveillance of vulnerable individuals is not necessary in any democratic society, and we are proud to represent these claimants in their fight against this poorly run and dystopian regime,” says Conor Lamb, who works in the public law department at Duncan Lewis.

One of the people whom Duncan Lewis is representing is a 25-year-old former asylum seeker from Sudan who arrived in the UK via a small boat and has no criminal history, according to his lawyers. The tag brought up painful memories of being bound and tortured during his journey to the UK, they argued in court. After two psychiatric reports were submitted to the government, the tag was taken off and his data deleted. Despite that, the man, who uses the pseudonym ADL, remains part of the court case in order to challenge the practice of tagging new arrivals.

Meanwhile, Nelson is still waiting for his tag to be taken off. He’s frustrated that he has to wear the tag despite already having served his time in prison. “Before all of this, I was social,” he says. Now, he says, he’s too self-conscious to go out much, in case others see the tag and mistake him for the perpetrator of a violent crime. He describes how the tag has left him feeling “up and down,” as if he has no good choices left. “In order for me to see my family and to be part of my family, I’m still being forced into 24/7 monitoring, someone watching me and watching what I do, every day.”

The UK Is GPS-Tagging Thousands of Migrants

Meet the guy who taught US intelligence agencies how to make the most of the ad tech ecosystem, "the largest information-gathering enterprise ever conceived by man."

How the Pentagon Learned to Use Targeted Ads to Find Its Targets—and Vladimir Putin

Republicans who run elections are split over whether to keep working with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to fight hackers, online falsehoods, and polling-place threats.

The meeting between top US election officials and their cybersecurity partners from the federal government almost went off without a hitch. Then Mac Warner spoke up.

Warner, West Virginia’s Republican secretary of state, didn’t have a mundane logistical question for the government representatives, who were speaking at the winter meeting of the National Association of Secretaries of State in Washington, DC, on February 8. Instead, Warner lambasted the officials for what he said was their agencies’ scheme to suppress the truth about US president Joe Biden’s son Hunter during the 2020 election and then cover their tracks.

“When we have our own federal agencies lying to the American people, that’s the most insidious thing that we can do in elections,” Warner told the officials from the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), who watched him impassively from the stage. “You all need to clean up your own houses.”

Neither of the officials responded to Warner, and the NASS meeting—a semiannual confab for the nation’s election administrators that deals with everything from mail-in voting to cyber threats—quickly moved on to other business. But Warner, who attended an election-denier rally after Biden’s 2020 victory and is now running for governor on a far-right platform, isn’t a fringe voice in the GOP. His impassioned speech reflected a growing right-wing backlash to the election security work of agencies like CISA and the FBI—one that now threatens the partnership that the federal government has been painstakingly building with state leaders over the eight years since Russia interfered in the 2016 election.

CISA plays a critical role in helping states run secure elections, but its work alerting social media companies to misinformation has earned it special contempt from conservatives. While most GOP secretaries of state are holding their fire about CISA’s efforts to combat online lies, Democrats and nonpartisan experts worry that that could change in the coming years. With national Republicans increasingly turning against CISA—investigating its activities and voting to slash its budget—the agency’s partnerships with GOP leaders in the states are more vulnerable than ever before.

“The hard and necessary work of securing our elections should not be a partisan issue,” says US representative Chris Deluzio, a Pennsylvania Democrat and former cyber policy scholar. “So I am very concerned that some Republican secretaries of state might undermine that work just to serve their selfish partisan interests.”

Stumbling Into Controversy

The federal program that earned Warner’s wrath began as a response to the rampant mis- and disinformation that has spread online since the 2016 election.

Determined to avoid another contest marred by viral false claims about voting processes, CISA in 2018 began coordinating conversations with social media companies and other federal agencies about the best ways to counter dangerous and destabilizing lies. During the 2020 election, through a process known as “switchboarding,” CISA alerted social media firms to complaints from state and local election officials about online misinformation, such as posts advertising incorrect voting times and locations.

It was in this spirit that FBI officials met with Twitter and Facebook executives in the lead-up to Election Day 2020 and advised them to be wary of Russian disinformation operations involving fake documents. That warning later led both companies to suppress posts about a controversial _New York Post_ story about the contents of a laptop belonging to Hunter Biden.

Silicon Valley’s response to the Hunter Biden laptop story outraged conservatives, who began accusing tech companies and their federal partners of conspiring to censor speech in an effort to rig the election. In subsequent investigations, CISA found itself squarely in the crosshairs. The agency had already earned the ire of former president Donald Trump and his allies for reassuring the public about the integrity of the 2020 election, but the new controversy practically made it a pariah on the right.

In June 2023, a House Judiciary Committee report blasted CISA as “the nerve center of the federal government’s domestic surveillance and censorship operations on social media.” A few months later, a federal appeals court partially affirmed a district judge’s ruling that placed limits on CISA’s ability to communicate with tech companies, finding that the agency’s work to fight disinformation “likely violated the First Amendment.”

Stunned by the intense backlash, CISA stopped working with social media platforms to combat mis- and disinformation. The FBI, too, scaled back its interactions with those companies, halting briefings about foreign interference activities. “The symbiotic relationship between the government and the social media companies has definitely been fractured,” a US official told NBC News.

CISA has staunchly avoided acknowledging the reality that its reputation has been damaged.

“CISA’s election security mission is stronger than ever,” says Cait Conley, a senior adviser to director Jen Easterly who oversees the agency’s election work. “We remain engaged with election officials in all 50 states and will continue to conduct all of our work in an apolitical and nonpartisan manner.”

A GOP Split

As the controversies have eroded CISA’s bipartisan brand, Republicans who run elections have split into two camps over whether to keep working with the agency to fight hackers, online falsehoods, and polling-place threats.

West Virginia’s Warner is the indisputable flag-bearer of the anti-CISA camp. “I’ve pulled away from them,” he tells WIRED at the NASS conference, a few hours after venting his frustrations to the federal officials. “I’m not attending their briefings, because I haven’t found anything useful out of them.”

Warner says he’s proud of the “tremendous advances” that federal and state officials have made together on election security since 2016, but he warns that CISA and the FBI will continue losing conservatives’ trust until they investigate their roles in the controversies of 2020. “I’ve brought this to the attention of CISA officials,” he says, “and there’s no effort there to do this.”

Warner argues that CISA’s warnings about foreign disinformation, AI-powered deep fakes, and death threats to election officials are “distractions from the real threat to American democracy” posed by censorship.

It remains unclear how many of Warner’s colleagues agree with him. But when WIRED surveyed the other 23 Republican secretaries who oversee elections in their states, several of them said they would continue working with CISA.

“The agency has been beneficial to our office by providing information and resources as it pertains to cybersecurity,” says JoDonn Chaney, a spokesperson for Missouri’s Jay Ashcroft.

South Dakota’s Monae Johnson says her office “has a good relationship with its CISA partners and plans to maintain the partnership.”

But others who praised CISA’s support also sounded notes of caution.

Idaho’s Phil McGrane says CISA is doing “critical work … to protect us from foreign cyber threats.” But he also tells WIRED that the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), a public-private collaboration group that he helps oversee, “is actively reviewing past efforts regarding mis/disinformation” to determine “what aligns best” with CISA’s mission.

Mississippi’s Michael Watson says that “statements following the 2020 election and some internal confidence issues we’ve since had to navigate have caused concern.” As federal and state officials gear up for this year’s elections, he adds, “my hope is CISA will act as a nonpartisan organization and stick to the facts.”

CISA’s relationships with Republican secretaries are “not as strong as they’ve been before,” says John Merrill, who served as Alabama’s secretary of state from 2015 to 2023. In part, Merrill says, that’s because of pressure from the GOP base. “Too many conservative Republican secretaries are not just concerned about how the interaction with those federal agencies is going, but also about how it’s perceived … by their constituents.”

Free Help at Risk

CISA’s defenders say the agency does critical work to help underfunded state and local officials confront cyber and physical threats to election systems.

The agency’s career civil servants and political leaders “have been outstanding” during both the Trump and Biden administrations, says Minnesota secretary of state Steve Simon, a Democrat.

Others specifically praised CISA’s coordination with tech companies to fight misinformation, arguing that officials only highlighted false claims and never ordered companies to delete posts.

“They’re just making folks aware of threats,” says Arizona’s Democratic secretary of state, Adrian Fontes. The real “bad actors,” he says, are the people who “want the election denialists and the rumor-mongers to run amok and just spread out whatever lies they want.”

If Republican officials begin disengaging from CISA, their states will lose critical security protections and resources. CISA sponsors the EI-ISAC, which shares information about threats and best practices for thwarting them; provides free services like scanning election offices’ networks for vulnerabilities, monitoring those networks for intrusions and reviewing local governments’ contingency plans; and convenes exercises to test election officials’ responses to crises.

“For GOP election officials to back away from \[CISA\] would be like a medical patient refusing to accept free wellness assessments, check-ups, and optional prescriptions from one of the world’s greatest medical centers,” says Eddie Perez, a former director for civic integrity at Twitter and a board member at the OSET Institute, a nonprofit group advocating for improved election technology.

Worse, some CISA projects will become less effective as they lose participants. The EI-ISAC’s information-sharing initiative is only as valuable as the information that state and federal agencies submit to it.

Even if most states stick with CISA, it would only take a few holdouts to create systemic risk. “America's election security posture is only as strong as its weakest jurisdiction,” says David Levine, the senior elections integrity fellow at the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy.

Cautious Optimism Despite ‘Strain’

Election security experts and Democratic officials express cautious optimism that there won’t be a GOP exodus from CISA this year.

“I have faith Republican secretaries of state will continue to prioritize their voters and collaborate with CISA to ensure a secure 2024 election,” says Mississippi representative Bennie Thompson, the top Democrat on the House Homeland Security Committee.

Lawrence Norden, the senior director of the Brennan Center for Justice’s Elections and Government Program, notes that some of CISA’s new regional election security advisers “have worked in recent years as or for Republican officeholders,” giving them credibility with GOP leaders.

According to Minnesota’s Simon, “the vast majority of secretaries find these partnerships valuable.”

Still, Warner says some secretaries quietly support his pushback against CISA and other aspects of the Biden administration’s election security strategy. “There \[is a\] meeting of the minds by some of the secretaries, especially on the right, with some of these similar concerns,” he says, even if “they’re not as outspoken as I am.”

That shared skepticism of CISA means that, even after Warner leaves office next year, the agency will remain on precarious footing with some of its Republican partners. For now, CISA’s allies are left hoping that the agency’s time-tested bonds will prove stronger than pressures from conservative activists.

“You can have strain in some areas of a relationship and still have a strong relationship,” says Arizona’s Fontes. “That’s what being a grown-up is about. And I think most of us are doing that pretty well.”

How a Right-Wing Controversy Could Sabotage US Election Security

A student investigation at the University of Waterloo uncovered a system that scanned countless undergrads without consent.

Canada-based University of Waterloo is racing to remove M&M-branded smart vending machines from campus after outraged students discovered the machines were covertly collecting face recognition data without their consent.

The scandal started when a student using the alias SquidKid47 posted an image on Reddit showing a campus vending machine error message, “Invenda.Vending.FacialRecognitionApp.exe,” displayed after the machine failed to launch a face recognition application that nobody expected to be part of the process of using a vending machine.

"Hey, so why do the stupid M&M machines have facial recognition?" SquidKid47 pondered.

The Reddit post sparked an investigation from a fourth-year student named River Stanley, who was writing for a university publication called MathNEWS.

Stanley sounded the alarm after consulting Invenda sales brochures that promised “the machines are capable of sending estimated ages and genders” of every person who used the machines—without ever requesting consent.

This frustrated Stanley, who discovered that Canada's privacy commissioner had years ago investigated a shopping mall operator called Cadillac Fairview after discovering some of the malls' informational kiosks were secretly “using facial recognition software on unsuspecting patrons.”

Only because of that official investigation did Canadians learn that “over 5 million nonconsenting Canadians” were scanned into Cadillac Fairview's database, Stanley reported. Where Cadillac Fairview was ultimately forced to delete the entire database, Stanley wrote that consequences for collecting similarly sensitive face recognition data without consent for Invenda clients like Mars remain unclear.

Stanley's report ended with a call for students to demand that the university “bar facial recognition vending machines from campus.”

A University of Waterloo spokesperson, Rebecca Elming, eventually responded, confirming to CTV News that the school had asked to disable the vending machine software until the machines could be removed.

Students told CTV News that their confidence in the university's administration was shaken by the controversy. Some students claimed on Reddit that they attempted to cover the vending machine cameras while waiting for the school to respond, using gum or Post-it notes. One student pondered whether “there are other places this technology could be being used” on campus.

Elming was not able to confirm the exact timeline for when the machines would be removed, other than telling Ars it would happen “as soon as possible.” Elming declined Ars' request to clarify if there are other areas of campus collecting face recognition data. She also wouldn't confirm, for any casual snackers on campus, when, if ever, students could expect the vending machines to be replaced with snack dispensers not equipped with surveillance cameras.

Invenda Claims Machines Are GDPR-Compliant

MathNEWS' investigation tracked down responses from companies responsible for smart vending machines on the University of Waterloo's campus.

Adaria Vending Services told MathNEWS that “what’s most important to understand is that the machines do not take or store any photos or images, and an individual person cannot be identified using the technology in the machines. The technology acts as a motion sensor that detects faces, so the machine knows when to activate the purchasing interface—never taking or storing images of customers.”

According to Adaria and Invenda, students shouldn't worry about data privacy because the vending machines are “fully compliant” with the world's toughest data privacy law, the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

“These machines are fully GDPR compliant and are in use in many facilities across North America,” Adaria's statement said. “At the University of Waterloo, Adaria manages last mile fulfillment services—we handle restocking and logistics for the snack vending machines. Adaria does not collect any data about its users and does not have any access to identify users of these M&M vending machines.”

A Vending Machine Error Revealed Secret Face Recognition Tech

Plus: Scammers try to dupe Apple with 5,000 fake iPhones, Avast gets fined for selling browsing data, and researchers figure out how to clone fingerprints from your phone screen.

Today marks two years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This week, we detailed the growing crisis in Eastern Ukraine, which is now littered with deadly mines. As it fights back the invading Russian forces, Ukraine’s government is working to develop new mine-clearing technology that could help save lives around the globe.

A leaked document obtained by WIRED has revealed the secret placement of gunshot-detection sensors in locations around the United States and its territories. According to the document, which ShotSpotter's parent company authenticated, the sensors, which are used by police departments in dozens of metropolitan areas in the United States, are largely located in low-income and minority communities, according to WIRED’s analysis, adding crucial context in a long-running debate over police use of the technology.

Speaking of leaks, WIRED this week obtained 15 years of messages posted to an internal system used by members of the US Congress. The House Intelligence Committee used the “Dear Colleagues” system to warn lawmakers of an “urgent matter”—something that has not happened since at least 2009. That urgent matter, which was quickly leaked to the press, turned out to be related to Russian military research of space-based weapons. But some sources say the matter wasn’t urgent at all, and the warning was instead an attempt by House Intelligence leadership to derail a vote on privacy reforms to a major US surveillance program.

On Tuesday, a coalition of law enforcement agencies led by the UK’s National Crime Agency disrupted the LockBit ransomware gang’s operation, seizing its infrastructure, dark-web leak site, and code used to carry out its attacks against thousands of institutions globally. Although ransomware attacks resulted in a record $1.1 billion in ransom payments last year, Anne Neuberger, a top US cyber official in the Biden administration, tells WIRED how the 2021 ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline has transformed the ways American institutions defend against and respond to such attacks.

In dual wins for privacy this week, the Signal Foundation began its rollout of usernames for its popular end-to-end encrypted messaging app. The update will allow people to connect without having to reveal their phone numbers. Meanwhile, Apple began to future-proof its encryption for iMessage with the launch of PQ3, a next-generation encryption protocol designed to resist decryption from quantum computers.

And there’s more. Each week, we highlight the news we didn’t cover in-depth ourselves. Click on the headlines below to read the full stories. And stay safe out there.

Hundreds of documents linked to a Chinese hacking-for-hire firm were dumped online this week. The files belong to i-Soon, a Shanghai-based company, and give a rare glimpse into the secretive world of the industry that supports China’s state-backed hacking. The leak includes details of Chinese hacking operations, lists of victims and potential targets, and the day-to-day complaints of i-Soon staff.

“These leaked documents support TeamT5’s long-standing analysis: China's private cybersecurity sector is pivotal in supporting China’s APT attacks globally,” Che Chang, a cyber threat analyst at the Taiwan-based cybersecurity firm TeamT5, tells WIRED. Chang says the company has been tracking i-Soon since 2020 and found that it has a close relationship with Chengdu 404, a company linked to China’s state-backed hackers.

While the documents have now been removed from GitHub, where they were first posted, the identity and motivations of the person, or people, who leaked them remains a mystery. However, Chang says the documents appear to be real, a fact confirmed by two employees working for i-Soon, according to the Associated Press, which reported that the company and police in China are investigating the leak.

“There are around eight categories of the leaked files. We can see how i-Soon engaged with China's national security authorities, the details of i-Soon’s products and financial problems,” Chang says. “More importantly, we spotted documents detailing how i-Soon supported the development of the notorious remote access Trojan (RAT), ShadowPad,” Chang adds. The ShadowPad malware has been used by Chinese hacking groups since at least 2017.

Since the files were first published, security researchers have been poring over their contents and analyzing the documentation. Included were references to software to run disinformation campaigns on X, details of efforts to access communications data across Asia, and targets within governments in the United Kingdom, India, and elsewhere, according to reports by the _New York Times_ and the _The Washington Post_. The documents also reveal how i-Soon worked for China’s Ministry of State Security and the People’s Liberation Army.

According to researchers at SentinelOne, the files also include pictures of “custom hardware snooping devices,” such as a power bank that could help steal data and the company’s marketing materials. “In a bid to get work in Xinjiang–where China subjects millions of Ugyhurs to what the UN Human Rights Council has called genocide–the company bragged about past counterterrorism work,” the researchers write. “The company listed other terrorism-related targets the company had hacked previously as evidence of their ability to perform these tasks, including targeting counterterrorism centers in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

The Federal Trade Commission has fined antivirus firm Avast $16.5 for collecting and selling people’s web browsing data through its browser extensions and security software. This included the details of web searches and the sites people visited, which, according to the FTC, revealed people’s “religious beliefs, health concerns, political leanings, location, financial status, visits to child-directed content and other sensitive information.” The company sold the data through its subsidiary Jumpshot, the FTC said in an order announcing the fine.

The ban also places five obligations on Avast: not to sell or license browsing data for advertising purposes; to obtain consent if it is selling data from non-Avast products; delete information it transferred to Jumpshot and any algorithms created from the data; tell customers about the data it sold; and introduce a new privacy program to address the problems the FTC found. An Avast spokesperson said that while they “disagree with the FTC’s allegations and characterization of the facts,” they are “pleased to resolve this matter.”

Two Chinese nationals living in Maryland—Haotian Sun and Pengfei Xue—have been convicted of mail fraud and a conspiracy to commit mail fraud for a scheme that involved sending 5,000 counterfeit iPhones to Apple. The pair, who could each face up to 20 years in prison, according to the The Register, hoped Apple would send them real phones in return. The fake phones had “spoofed serial numbers and/or IMEI numbers” to trick Apple stores or authorized service providers into thinking they were genuine. The scam took place between May 2017 and September 2019 and would have cost Apple more than $3 million in losses, a US Department of Justice press release says.

Security researchers from the US and China have created a new side-channel attack that can reconstruct people’s fingerprints from the sounds they create as you swipe them across your phone screen. The researchers used built-in microphones in devices to capture the “faint friction sounds” made by a finger and then used these sounds to create fingerprints. “The attack scenario of PrintListener is extensive and covert,” the researchers write in a paper detailing their work. “It can attack up to 27.9 percent of partial fingerprints and 9.3 percent of complete fingerprints within five attempts.” The research raises concerns about real-world hackers who are attempting to steal people’s biometrics to access bank accounts.

A Mysterious Leak Exposed Chinese Hacking Secrets

The locations of microphones used to detect gunshots have been kept hidden from police and the public. A WIRED analysis of leaked coordinates confirms arguments critics have made against the technology.

Finding shell casings can be extremely difficult. A Los Angeles Police Department officer not authorized to speak to the media tells WIRED they’ve spent “hours” searching for bullet casings. Just because officers don’t find evidence of gunfire, they say, doesn’t mean it didn’t happen.

While SoundThinking says its alerts are reviewed by its Incident Review Center before being sent to the police, in Pasadena, officers who investigated ShotSpotter alerts reported that the suspected gunfire was sometimes something else entirely: a car backfiring, construction noise, or fireworks, Knock LA reported.

Chris Baumohl, an EPIC Law Fellow and coauthor of the petition to the DOJ, tells WIRED that our findings confirm what the nonprofit wrote in their petition in September: that ShotSpotter surveillance disproportionately occurs in communities of color. He also alleges that the technology primes police to go into minority communities believing that shots are fired, whether accurate or not. The result, Baumohl argues, is that community members are more likely to be picked up on bench warrants, misdemeanors, and for other reasons unrelated to guns.

In February, a leaked internal report from the State's Attorney’s Office in Illinois’ Cook County, where Chicago is located, found that nearly a third of arrests stemming from a ShotSpotter alert had nothing to do with a gun, Baumohl points out. On February 13, Chicago mayor Brandon Johnson, a vocal critic of ShotSpotter, said the city won't renew its contract with SoundThinking.

According to SoundThinking’s Chittum, the idea that police show up to ShotSpotter alerts ready to make arrests is speculation based on a few high-profile incidents. Instead, he argues that ShotSpotter provides law enforcement with accurate data to engage the community safely. “It allows police to knock on a door and tell residents, ‘Hey, we got a report of gunfire, we are just checking to see if everyone is OK. Did you hear anything? Did you see anything? If you do, please call us; we care, and we’ll come.’”

Ultimately, Chittum argues, ShotSpotter is simply a tool. When used correctly it can help police-community relations. “It’s up to the police to decide how they use it,” he says.

But what happens on the ground often paints a more complicated picture than what Chittum describes. WIRED reviewed body camera footage and police records of a 2022 ShotSpotter arrest in Cincinnati. According to the records, at 8:21 pm on New Year's Eve, police officers were dispatched to an area where two loud sounds were picked up by SoundThinking sensors. When the officers arrived, they quickly detained a tall man in a blue hoodie and black jacket who was standing near the corner where the technology had indicated gunfire.

According to police records, there were nine officers on the scene that night. Body camera footage shows one of the officers rifling through the man’s pockets as others milled around. Some pointed their flashlights at the ground or in the windows of parked cars. Others chatted, speculating about the potential whereabouts of bullet casings.

“I’m glad we could come out and help,” a sergeant watching the man being searched tells the officer standing next to him.

Police never found a bullet casing, gun, or bullet hole. They arrested the man anyway. After running his name through their on-car computer, they discovered he had warrants out for his arrest. He had failed to appear in court for traffic violations.

_Additional data analysis by Matt Casey, data science content lead at Snorkel AI, a firm that helps companies with AI projects and builds custom AI with its data development platform._

_Updated 2/23/2024, 12:15 pm EST to clarify that the list of sensors included in the document WIRED obtained may not include every ShotSpotter microphone._

Here Are the Secret Locations of ShotSpotter Gunfire Sensors

The US Congress was preparing to vote on a key foreign surveillance program last week. Then a wild Russian threat appeared.

A decision by US House Intelligence Committee (HPSCI) chair Mike Turner to sound the alarm over space-based Russian military research was far more extraordinary than previously reported.

A WIRED review of an internal messaging system used by the United States Congress shows that HPSCI rarely sends members invites to review classified documents and has not—in at least 15 years—alarmed lawmakers by announcing an “urgent” threat against the United States.

The Dear Colleague system is widely used by congressional committees and lawmakers individually to circulate internal memos, invites, and other announcements. This week, WIRED obtained all messages sent House-wide by HPSCI since 2009. Copies of Dear Colleague messages sent since then are backed up by the system. The source of the messages was granted anonymity because their disclosure was not authorized.

The messages reveal that only on a handful of occasions has HPSCI sent letters informing members of classified documents available for review. Of those, none had previously demanded “urgent” attention.

The urgency with which Turner and other HPSCI members characterized the disclosure—only later revealed to concern Russian military research—has been downplayed by fellow lawmakers and Biden administration officials. As a result, criticism has fallen on Turner over the announcement, which generated a slew of provocative headlines and gave life to vague concerns by US officials over the protection of classified sources and methods.

A _Washington Post_ headline that remains visible to users on Google wildly declares: “U.S. officials say Russia has deployed a nuclear weapon in space.” Covering the story for CNN, national security reporter Jim Sciutto was far more tempered, telling TV viewers: “This is something that Russia is experimenting with, looking into designing. This is not a clear and present danger.”

Democratic representative Seth Moulton, who serves on the Armed Services Committee, lambasted Turner during the same CNN segment, labeling him an “intelligence leaker.” Moulton added that two years had passed since he’d first been briefed on the Russian research. “I haven’t had a problem keeping it a secret,” he said.

WIRED reported on Friday that sources on Capitol Hill had begun accusing Turner and his Democratic counterpart on HPSCI, Jim Himes, of issuing the disclosure to influence a vote happening simultaneously to reauthorize a controversial surveillance program, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Turner and Himes, after both signing the “Dear Colleague” message the night before, failed to appear at a Rules Committee hearing on Wednesday just as news of the Russian threat went viral.

House speaker Mike Johnson abruptly canceled the vote shortly after, under what sources describe as intense pressure from Turner.

HSCPI spokesperson Jeff Naft—who did not respond to an inquiry prior to WIRED’s story on Friday—later refuted the allegation, calling the implication of ties between the surveillance vote and the Russian intel “way off base.”

The spokesperson said it was a screenshot of HPSCI’s Dear Colleague letter—posted by reporters online less than a day after it was sent—that forced Turner to issue a press release about the supposed Russian threat.

Turner’s press release notably went further than HPSCI’s letter, pressing US president Joe Biden to personally “declassify all information” concerning the threat. The next day, Turner issued a second statement declaring he’d worked closely “with the Biden administration” before notifying Congress. Naft, the HPSCI spokesperson, clarified by email that Turner had worked with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on the language describing the threat contained in the Dear Colleague letter. (Naft stressed Turner had “NEVER” stated he’d cooperated with the White House.)

Turner’s second statement added that HPSCI had voted 23–1 to make the disclosure. According to the committee’s own rules, a vote is not required to bring classified material to the attention of the chairmen and ranking members of other committees; only House-wide alerts require a vote. It is unclear which HPSCI member voted against the disclosure, as no official roll call was taken.

A senior congressional source tells WIRED the Dear Colleague letter was always destined to cause panic. It is widely understood that the letters are not a secure form of communication and are often disclosed to reporters and others working off the Hill.

Only four times in the past decade and a half, according to WIRED’s review of the system, has HPSCI used a Dear Colleague letter to draw attention to classified material—outside of routine budgetary concerns.

The first such message is dated March 2009 and pertains to two classified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports. The subject of the reports is undeclared. A second letter was issued by HPSCI and signed by former congressperson Devin Nunes on January 10, 2017, informing members of a classified report on “Russian activities and intentions in the recent US election.”

Neither letter is marked urgent.

A third letter informing members about the option to review classified material is dated February 24, 2010; however, it makes clear the material was made available at the request of the intelligence community (IC). It is one of numerous letters in which HPSCI is seen lobbying on the spy agencies’ behalf—in this case, to support a renewal of the 9/11-era USA PATRIOT Act, today defunct due to a lack of support in Congress.

A plurality of HPSCI’s Dear Colleague letters are aimed at whipping support for bills that reauthorize or advance US spy powers. Others urge lawmakers to vote against legislation that would enhance Americans’ privacy protections. One such letter reads simply: “Don’t Handcuff the FBI and Intelligence Community.”

Six other letters are invitations to classified briefings held by intelligence agencies. HPSCI routinely acts as a mediator between the agencies and members of Congress, arranging briefings and other events on the intelligence community’s behalf.

HPSCI sent an additional three Dear Colleagues letters the morning after its “urgent” warning about Russia went out: Each asked members to support various amendments to a FISA bill during an upcoming vote that HPSCI’s chair was, simultaneously, working to get called off.

Sources told WIRED that Johnson’s decision to delay the vote on FISA came amid a sudden threat by Turner to kill the bill the moment it got to the floor. Turner was motivated to stop the bill’s progress at any cost, they said, due to the growing odds of a rival committee passing amendments of their own—to dramatically curtail the FBI’s domestic surveillance abilities.

_Updated 2/22/2024, 3:55 pm EST: Clarified the procedural requirements for bringing classified information to the attention of members of the House of Representatives._

Source

Wired