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Mattermost versions 10.5.x <= 10.5.5, 9.11.x <= 9.11.15, 10.8.x <= 10.8.0, 10.7.x <= 10.7.2, 10.6.x <= 10.6.5 fail to properly enforce channel member management permissions when adding participants to playbook runs. This allows authenticated users with member-level permissions to bypass system admin restrictions and add or remove users to/from private channels via the playbook run participants feature, even when the 'Manage Members' permission has been explicitly removed. This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive channel content and allow guest users to gain channel management privileges.
Mattermost versions 10.5.x <= 10.5.5, 9.11.x <= 9.11.15, 10.8.x <= 10.8.0, 10.7.x <= 10.7.2, 10.6.x <= 10.6.5 fail to properly validate channel membership when retrieving playbook run metadata, allowing authenticated users who are playbook members but not channel members to access sensitive information about linked private channels including channel name, display name, and participant count through the run metadata API endpoint.
Orkes Conductor v3.21.11 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands through unrestricted access to Java classes.
string-math v1.2.2 was discovered to contain a Regex Denial of Service (ReDoS) which is exploited via a crafted input.
electron's ASAR Integrity can be bypass by modifying the content. ### Impact This only impacts apps that have the `embeddedAsarIntegrityValidation` and `onlyLoadAppFromAsar` [fuses](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/fuses) enabled. Apps without these fuses enabled are not impacted. This issue is specific to Windows, apps using these fuses on macOS are unimpacted. Specifically this issue can only be exploited if your app is launched from a filesystem the attacker has write access too. i.e. the ability to edit files inside the .app bundle on macOS which these fuses are supposed to protect against. ### Workarounds There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `30.0.5` * `31.0.0-beta.1` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
### Summary Sending transactions with fees different than native Babylon genesis denom (`ubbn`) leads to chain halt. ### Impact Denial of Service - Due to panic in the `x/distribution` module `BeginBlocker` triggered by a error when sending fees from `feeCollector` to `x/distribution` module - https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/main/x/distribution/keeper/allocation.go#L28 Babylon Genesis will halt
### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ The configAPI is an internal service and hence should never be exposed to the internet. With that said, this is a serious vulnerability that has a large internal surface attack area that exposes all sorts of information from the IDP including clients, users, scripts ..etc. This affects all users of Janssen <1.8.0 and Gluu Flex <5.8.0 ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ All users are advised to upgrade immediately to [1.8.0](https://github.com/JanssenProject/jans/releases/tag/v1.8.0) for Janssen users and [5.8.0](https://github.com/GluuFederation/flex/releases/tag/v5.8.0) For Flex users. ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ The user can potentially fork and build the config api and patch it in their system following the commit here https://github.com/JanssenProject/jans/commit/92eea4d4637f1cae16ad2f07b2c16378ff3f...
## Summary ## All user accounts authenticate towards a *File Browser* instance with a password. A missing password policy and brute-force protection makes it impossible for administrators to properly secure the authentication process. ## Impact ## Attackers can mount a brute-force attack against the passwords of all accounts of an instance. Since the application is lacking the ability to prevent users from choosing a weak password, the attack is likely to succeed. ## Vulnerability Description ## The application implement a classical authentication scheme using a username and password combination. While employed by many systems, this scheme is quite error-prone and a common cause for vulnerabilities. File Browser's implementation has multiple weak points: 1. Since the application is missing the capability for administrators to define a password policy, users are at liberty to set trivial and well-known passwords such as `secret` or even ones with only single digit like `1`. 2. New...
## Summary ## Files managed by the *File Browser* can be shared with a link to external persons. While the application allows protecting those links with a password, the implementation is error-prone, making an incidental unprotected sharing of a file possible. ## Impact ## File owners might rest in the assumption that their shared files are only accessible to persons knowing the defined password, giving them a false sense of security. Meanwhile, attackers gaining access to the unprotected link can use this information alone to download the possibly sensitive file. ## Vulnerability Description ## When sharing a file, the user is presented with a dialog asking for an optional password to protect the file share. The assumption of the user at this point would be, that the shared file won't be accessible without knowledge of the password. After clicking on `SHARE` the following dialog opens allowing the file's owner to copy the share-link:  If...